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There is a negative portrayal of contemporary conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan as a 
result of the rise in the number of deaths of service personnel. The common view of the 
media, coroners, military charities and academic commentators is that this is a result of 
the failure of the MoD and the Government to provide adequate equipment to service 
personnel on the battlefield. 
Through the critical evaluation of key equipment cases, combat immunity law, human 
rights law and health and safety legislation and civil law this thesis will evaluate 
whether the MoD can be held liable in tort for the procurement of inadequate equipment 
on the battlefield, and whether service personnel are able to rely upon any legal 
remedies in the event that injury is sustained in combat as a result of equipment 
deficiencies. 
In order to investigate whether the MoD can be held liable in tort for equipment 
deficiencies the thesis will consider current civil law in establishing whether the MoD 
owed a duty of care in combat and if so, in which circumstances that duty of care has 
been breached. The thesis will consider the doctrine of combat immunity and whether it 
imposes restrictions on service personnel’s human rights or whether the Human Rights 
Act surpasses combat immunity, before turning to the evaluation of the Armed Forces 
Compensation Scheme and whether it adequately compensated injured service 
personnel. 
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Introduction 
In recent years the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have brought attention to the deaths 
and serious injuries of armed forces personnel which has exposed questions of serious 
deficiencies in both the legal and moral duty of care owed by the state to service 
personnel on operations. The number of British armed forces fatalities stands at 444 
after three soldiers died on the 30th April 2013 when their vehicle was hit by an 
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) in Helmand province.1 While most of the deaths 
and injuries of service personnel have been caused by IEDs, others have been caused by 
friendly fire accidents, with the main argument being whether the equipment that 
service personnel are deployed on operations with are suitable for the conditions they 
face.2 The press have published accounts of deaths and serious injuries of service 
personnel that have been linked to inadequate body armour, vehicles and equipment. 
One of the main incidents regarding inadequate equipment concerned the multiple 
deaths of personnel on board a Nimrod aircraft, another concerning the casualties 
sustained by personnel travelling in the Snatch Land Rover. More recently the case of 
Smith and Others v Ministry of Defence3 came before the courts with regard to service 
personnel deaths in Challenger tanks and Snatch Land Rovers. There has been a recent 
Supreme Court ruling on this case which has changed the law in relation to deaths and 
injuries of service personnel in combat, although the judgment on this case has come 
too late to be properly incorporated into the main body of the thesis. 
These apparent equipment deficiencies have led to cases coming before the courts 
which have revealed the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) reliance on civil combat 
                                                                 
1 Anon, ‘UK military deaths in Afghanistan’ (BBC News, 27 March 2013) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-15188729> accessed 12 June 2013  
2 Ibid 
3 [2013] UKSC 41 
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immunity in the event that a claim in negligence is brought against them by a member 
of the armed forces. Combat immunity, an aspect of what was previously known as 
Crown immunity provides that, ‘unless Parliament intends otherwise, the usual law of 
tortious negligence does not apply to the Crown and its bodies’4 in the event that the 
death or serious injury of a member of the armed forces is a result of combat. Does this 
then mean that the deaths or serious injuries as a result of combat will automatically be 
immune from tort resulting in a member of the armed forces being unable to make a 
claim against the MoD? This question has been argued and interpreted in the English 
courts and is the foundation for discussing liability for the deaths and injuries which 
have occurred on operations caused by inadequate equipment.   
Britain has long acknowledged a duty of care in a non-legal sense to its armed forces 
that dates back to the 1593 Act for the Necessary Relief of Soldiers and Mariners passed 
by parliament under Queen Elizabeth I.5 This non-legal duty of care is now embedded 
in the Military Covenant, defined as a ‘mutual agreement between the nation, the 
Government and each individual soldier’.6 The covenant stated that military service 
‘imposes certain limitations on freedom and requires a degree of self-sacrifice’ and in 
return for surrendering these liberties, soldiers should ‘always expect fair treatment’ 
from the Government.7 
This thesis proceeds on the assumption that service personnel are not able to rely 
upon a legal duty of care against the MoD when injured in combat, and where a failure 
of this duty of care has occurred, service personnel are being deployed on operations 
                                                                 
4 Select Committees on Home Affairs and Work and Pensions, Crown Immunity: removal of Crown 
immunity (HC 2005-06, 540-II) 
5 ‘A broken covenant’ [2011] Defence Management Journal 
<http://www.defencemanagement.com/feature_story.asp?id=15915> accessed 2 March 2013 
6 A Sparrow, ‘What is the military covenant?’ Guardian (London, 4 March 2008) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/mar/04/defence.military> accessed 2 March 2013 
7 General Sir R Dannatt, ‘Values and standards of the British army’ (Army. MoD, January 2008) 
< http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/v_s_of_the_british_army.pdf> accessed 4 March 2013 
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with inadequate equipment with no legal remedies available to them if they were 
seriously injured, nor to their dependants if they are killed as a result of operational 
service. 
Chapter one establishes a number of combat-related equipment and psychological 
problems which service personnel face in combat. This chapter will set the scene to 
discuss whether the MoD should be held legally liable for the deaths or injuries of 
service personnel as a result of inadequate equipment. 
Chapter two will review the duty of care, in tort, generally focusing on the three 
stage test set out in Caparo v Dickman,8 of foreseeability, proximity and fair, just and 
reasonableness and will suggest whether a duty of care would be owed by the MoD to 
service personnel injured or killed in combat due to inadequate equipment if there was 
no combat immunity. 
Chapter three then turns to the current law of combat immunity and will discuss the 
effect of combat immunity in situations of armed conflict and post-traumatic stress. 
Relevant sections of the Crown Proceedings Acts 1947 and 1987 will be evaluated in 
relation to three influential cases; Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence9, Multiple Claimants v 
Ministry of Defence10 and Bici v Ministry of Defence.11 These will be analysed in order 
to consider whether the MoD benefits from the defence of combat immunity in 
situations where inadequacies in the supply of equipment have led to death or injury as 
opposed to deaths of service personnel following a reckless order to attack. 
Chapter four will discuss the public policy arguments which the MoD rely upon to 
negate the existence of a duty of care in combat. The overall purpose of this chapter is 
                                                                 
8 [1990] 2 AC 605 HL 
9 [1996] QB 732 
10 [2003] EWHC 1134 QB 
11 [2004] EWHC 786 QB 
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to address the question of whether service personnel are able to succeed in a claim 
against the MoD for a breach of duty of care with regard to equipment deficiencies or 
whether public policy considerations enable the MoD to be free from liability. 
The fifth chapter explores the standard of care in that if the MoD is found to owe a 
duty of care, is that duty of care breached by the supply of inadequate equipment and 
care? 
Chapter six will concentrate on the principles of causation to establish whether 
roadside bombs such as Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and enemy fire break the 
chain in causation so that it is deemed that the MoD are not responsible for the deaths of 
service personnel, even if they are supplied with inadequate equipment. 
Chapter seven turns to another area of law which the public might expect would 
afford some protection to service personnel, specifically, the Human Rights Act 1998. 
British military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have given rise to important 
judicial examinations of the jurisdiction question and whether service personnel are able 
to rely upon the protections set out within the Human Rights Act when on combat 
operations overseas. The application of article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) to personnel will be discussed in relation to three main cases; Osman v 
Ferguson,12 Osman v United Kingdom13 and Smith and Others v Ministry of Defence.14 
These cases will give insight into whether by the MoD relying on combat immunity in 
times of war, it has breached a member of the armed forces ECHR to a fair trial under 
article 6. Article 2 of the ECHR will then be discussed in relation to the following cases;  
                                                                 
12 (1993) 4 All  ER 344 
13 (2000) 29 EHRR 245 
14 [2012] EWCA CIV 1365 
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R (on the application of Smith) v Oxfordshire Assistant Deputy Coroner,15 Smith and 
Others v Ministry of Defence,16 Albutt and others v Ministry of Defence,17 Bankovic v 
Belgium18 and R (Al Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence.19  
Chapter eight takes up the baton where traditional legal remedies end and focuses on 
whether members of the armed forces are able to make a ‘no-fault’ compensation claim 
in the event of injury due to service, including combat operations. These claims can be 
made under the Armed Forces Compensation Scheme and although service personnel 
are able to rely upon the scheme to obtain some form of compensation for their injuries, 
there is unsurprisingly still concern over levels of compensation payments they typically 
receive.  This chapter will therefore discuss the tariff levels of the scheme and whether 
this ‘no-fault’ approach produces practical financial support to those suffering with life 
changing injuries. 
This thesis will carry out a close textual analysis of current legislation, case law and 
legal remedies in order to determine which of these, if any, service personnel are able to 
rely upon in the event of serious injury due to combat and separately whether the MoD 
can be held liable for supplying inadequate equipment. It is arguable that a duty of care 
ought to be owed to service personnel in combat if they are provided with inadequate 
equipment. In order to evaluate this argument the thesis will first set out the physical 
and psychological issues surrounding the conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
                                                                 
15 [2008] EWHC 694 
16 [2013] UKSC 41 
17 [2013] UKSC 41 
18 (2007) 44 EHRR SE5 
19 (2007) UKHL 26 
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Chapter One 
Physical and psychological problems of combat 
 
This chapter will set out the problems surrounding the Iraq and Afghanistan wars in 
relation to the equipment that has been deployed and also to psychological problems 
that service personnel have faced. These problems highlight the main argument present 
in this thesis, whether the MoD owe a legal duty of care to service personnel in combat 
and whether by deploying inadequate equipment they have allegedly failed in their duty 
of care. Firstly the chapter will underline the main equipment problems, turning then to 
the psychological problems which service personnel may face. 
1.1. Is military equipment adequate for the battlefield? 
 It is perhaps a given that when a state enters into armed conflict there will be a loss of 
life and injury to service personnel, and the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are no 
exception. The risk of death or serious injury should not be increased by the failure to 
provide adequate equipment. However, numerous cases have been highlighted by the 
media, such as the deaths of service personnel in the Nimrod aircraft and the Snatch 
Land Rover, which have emphasised the contribution of inadequate equipment to 
military deaths.20 From the beginning of the Afghanistan war in 2001 until January 
2013, 596 service personnel have been very seriously injured and 440 have suffered 
fatalities.21 Service personnel are prepared to risk their lives in the service of their 
country and in return for their service and commitment; it could be argued that it is only 
reasonable for them to expect adequate support from the Government, such as the 
timely provision of vital equipment. 
                                                                 
20 R Norton-Taylor, ‘Not all  deaths in Afghanistan are down to the enemy’ Guardian (London, 10 June 
2008) 
< http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/jun/10/military.afghanistan> accessed 3 March 2013 
21 Afghanistan casualty and fatality table, Available on the MoD website. 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi le/82766/20130213_O
p_Herrick_to_31_Jan_13.pdf> accessed 6 March 2013 
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 Two well documented cases which have been highlighted by the media concerning 
the deaths of service personnel in the Nimrod aircraft and the Snatch Land Rover, have 
been argued to have been caused by inadequate equipment. The Nimrod was not 
deemed to be air-worthy as a result of problems with air-to-air refuelling and the design 
of the Land Rovers was criticised for not providing adequate protection against roadside 
bombs as a consequence of its light armoury.22 
The RAF Nimrods were deployed to Afghanistan to be used by service personnel on 
operations. Tragically in 2006 one aircraft exploded in mid-air killing the entire crew on 
board. The cause of the explosion was found to be leaked fuel during air-to-air 
refuelling igniting following contact with an exposed electrical element.23 There had 
been previous incidents and warning signs of some problems which were relevant to the 
Nimrod explosion, such as potential fuel leaks and the risk of fuel igniting.24 In his 2009 
report, Charles Haddon-Cave QC, (now Haddon-Cave J) noted that failure to learn from 
previous warning signs to ensure that the aircraft was safe indicated a failure of the 
MoD, adding that; ‘rarely did anyone attempt to grasp the wider implications of a 
particular incident for the future, or spot trends or patterns, or read across the issues to 
other aircraft’s.’25  As there seem to have been no efforts made to take the previous 
risks into account, it could be argued that the MoD are legally accountable for the 
deaths of the 14 service personnel, and that this failure could be seen as a breach of the 
MoD’s moral and legal duty of care towards service personnel. If the courts were to find 
                                                                 
22 Anon, ‘Q and A: Snatch Land Rovers’ (BBC News, 10 July 2009) 
< http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7703703.stm> accessed 3 March 2013 
23 A Stickler, ‘An RAF officer faces court martial over Nimrod deaths’ (The Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism, 27 March 2011) 
< http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2011/03/27/an-raf-officer-faces-court-martial-over-nimrod-
deaths/> accessed 3 March 2013 
24 C Haddon-Cave QC, ‘The Nimrod Review: An independent review of the broader issues surrounding 
the loss of the RAF Nimrod MR2 Aircraft XV230 in Afghanistan in 2006’ (HC 1025, 28 October 2009) ch 8 
< http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc0809/hc10/1025/1025.asp> accessed 3 March 
2013 
25 Ibid Para 8.5 
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that the deaths of the service personnel were a direct result of the MoD’s failure to make 
the aircraft airworthy, then would this be a significant element in establishing 
negligence, and whether or not the existence of a legal duty of care is owed by the 
MoD? The existence here of a judicially recognised legal duty of care, however, will be 
explored in chapters two and three when the common law and its consequences are 
considered and evaluated in relation to military operations. 
The following case of the Snatch Land Rover also involved the deaths and serious 
injuries of a number of service personnel. The Land Rovers were originally deployed as 
a cheap and quick way of transporting troops in Northern Ireland, and were not seen by 
service personnel as being adequate protection against roadside bombs.26 Steve 
McLoughlin, a former member of the Royal Green Jackets who served in Iraq, said with 
reference to the Snatch Land Rover: 
You drive over a landmine in a very lightly-armoured Land-Rover Snatch and it is 
not much different than driving over it in a Ford Escort. At the very least you are 
going to lose limbs, horrific injuries if you survive, you are probably going to get 
killed outright.27 
It could be argued that a heavily armoured vehicle could be severely damaged by a 
powerful Improvised Explosive Device (IED) as seen in the recent case of the Mastiff 
armoured vehicle which resulted in the loss of three servicemen. However, unlike the 
Mastiff the Snatch Land Rover is not made to withstand powerful blasts from IED’s as  
they were mainly for the use of transportation for service personnel in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, whereas heavily armoured vehicle’s are built to be able to withstand such 
explosions and therefore should be more suitable for combat operations.  
                                                                 
26 M Bulstrode, ‘Snatch Land Rovers blamed for dozens of deaths’ Independent (London, 9 March 2010) 
< http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/snatch-land-rovers-blamed-for-dozens-of-
deaths-1918732.html> accessed 3 March 2013 
27 Anon, ‘UK SAS Commander quits, citing inadequate equipment’ (Defence Industry Daily, 17 December 
2008) 
< http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/UK-SAS-Commander-Quits-Citing-Inadequate-Equipment-
05141/> accessed 3 March 2013 
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The failure of the Land Rover to protect service personnel against roadside bombs 
resulted in open disapproval by a military figure, SAS commander, Major Morley. He 
announced his resignation as a result of the Government allegedly repeatedly ignoring 
warning signs that the vehicles were not adequate enough for operations in Afghanistan. 
Morley stated that in his opinion ‘chronic underinvestment by the MoD’ was to blame 
for the deaths of those travelling in the Land Rovers.28 Although the majority of the 
blame for service personnel deaths as a result of equipment failure is on the MoD, it is 
difficult for service personnel to bring a negligence claim against the MoD as there is a 
wider question of causation, that is, whether the MoD’s breach was a direct cause of the 
deaths or injuries. However this will be explored in more detail in chapter six. 
While the loss of lives as a result of the Nimrod explosion and the IED effects on the 
Land Rover has been well documented in the media, it falls into a wider, concerning 
picture of equipment deficiencies. Not dissimilar to the Snatch Land Rover issue, 
concerns about service personnel travelling in Challenger tanks came before the courts. 
The case facts demonstrated that one of the tanks had fired upon the other during the 
confusion of battle as a result of the fitting of inadequate surveillance devices.29 The 
Defence Analytical Services Agency (DASA) has revealed that as a result of the 
perceived lack of adequate equipment the majority of service personnel in 2008 were 
dissatisfied with the standard of equipment, with one in two respondents saying that 
                                                                 
28 T Harding, ‘Exclusive: SAS Chief quits over ”negligence that kil led his troops”’ Daily Telegraph (London, 
31 October 2008) 
< http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/3332417/Exclusive-SAS-chief-quits-
over-negligence-that-kil led-his-troops.html> accessed 4 March 2013 
29 N Hopkins, ‘High Court ruling opens way for MoD to be sued over soldiers deaths’ Guardian (London, 
20 June 2011) 
< http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/jun/30/high-court-mod-sued-soldiers-deaths> accessed 4 March 
2013 
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they ‘simply did not have enough equipment to do their jobs properly’.30 It also found 
that when surveying 10,500 service personnel only 31% were satisfied with the main 
equipment at their disposal.31 Soldiers have also repeatedly complained about the lack 
of key personal equipment, such as standard night vision kits and weaponry.32 One 
example of this lack of equipment was the serious failure of the MoD to provide night 
vision goggles which resulted in the death of Lance Corporal Jake Alderton as the truck 
he was travelling in drove off a bridge into a river as a result of ineffective night vision 
equipment.33   
In effect it seems that there were two major problems with equipment. Firstly there is 
not enough equipment to give to all service personnel on operations and secondly the 
equipment deployed is not adequate enough for the conditions of battle. However, 
inadequate equipment is not the only issue that arises when confronted with service 
personnel on operations. There are also concerns with mental health issues such as Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) to which this thesis will now turn. 
1.2. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is an anxiety disorder caused by a very 
stressful, frightening or distressing event such as military combat. It can develop 
immediately after experiencing a disturbing event or it can occur weeks, months or even 
                                                                 
30 T Harding, ‘Armed forces survey reveals poor equipment and morale’ Daily Telegraph (London, 9 July 
2008) < http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/2276421/Armed-forces-survey-
reveals-poor-equipment-and-morale.html> accessed 4 March 2013 
31 M Townsend, ‘Troops say they lack the right kit to fight in Helmand’ Guardian (London, 9 August 
2009) 
< http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/aug/09/afghanistan-soldiers-deaths-compensation-equipment> 
accessed 4 March 2013 
32 Ibid 
33 T Harding, ‘Soldier dies in Afghanistan due to failure of night vision goggles’ Telegraph (London, 12 
January 2009) 
< http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/4224412/Soldier-died-in-Afghanistan-due-to-
failures-with-night-vision-goggles.html> accessed 4 March 2013 
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years later.34 Symptoms of PTSD often include reliving the traumatic event through 
nightmares and flashbacks, with the sufferer feeling isolated, irritable and guilty.35 
Joining the armed forces exposes service personnel to increased risk of death or serious 
injury, whether that injury be physical or psychiatric, this is the nature of the military 
role.36 The relationship between combat and psychiatric breakdown has been well 
recognised and attempts at preventing psychiatric injury, by screening before 
deployment or debriefing after, have been disappointing.37 This was highlighted in the 
high profile case of Multiple Claimants v Ministry of Defence38 where a group action 
was unsuccessfully raised against the MoD for failing to detect and prevent psychiatric 
injury.39 
The extent of the PTSD problem among service personnel is considerable and it is 
clear that the current approach does not provide service personnel suffering from PTSD 
with the effective treatment they deserve.40 An example of this is the case of Liam 
Smith who upon joining the British Army did a six-month tour in Afghanistan in which 
his best friend and platoon sergeant was killed. When he returned home he developed a 
drink problem and became violent and withdrawn. Despite showing classic symptoms 
of PTSD he received no help or counselling from the Army and instead was sent back to 
Helmand both in 2009 and 2011 after the first tour. It was not until he suffered a 
                                                                 
34 Anon, ‘Post Traumatic Stress Disorder’ (NHS Choices, 12 December 2011)  
<http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Post-traumatic-stress-disorder/Pages/Introduction.aspx> accessed 1st 
June 2012 
35 Ibid 
36 C Dandeker, ‘On the need to be different: military uniqueness and civil military relations in modern 
society’ (2001) 146 RUSI Journal 4 
37 S Wessely, ‘Risk, psychiatry and the military’ (2005) 186 The British Journal of Psychiatry 459  
38 Multiple Claimants v Ministry of Defence [2003] EWHC 1134 (QB) 
39 Ibid 
40 Defence Committee, Defence- Seventh report (HC 2007-08) 
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complete psychosomatic breakdown on duty in 2011 that he was finally diagnosed with 
PTSD, two years after first showing symptoms.41 
Is there not a legal or moral duty on the MoD to proactively detect and treat PTSD in 
much the same way as they would treat a physical injury? It seems that the question of 
whether a proactive moral or legal duty is to be imposed on the MoD is a difficult 
question for the courts to consider as in order for a successful claim to be made against 
the MoD in relation to failing to detect and treat PTSD, service personnel have to 
identify a negligent failure on part of the MoD.42 The difficulties in identifying such 
negligence will be discussed further in chapters two and three. 
David Modell who was interviewed by the BBC after making a documentary for 
Channel Four’s Dispatches programme named ‘Battle Scarred’ about soldiers struggling 
with PTSD, stated that; ‘there is urgent need of help that kicks in as soon as the soldier 
comes back off tour’ as ‘soldiers coming out of the Army have no idea how to access 
help groups, and the responsibility is put on the person who is suffering to seek help’.43 
It is important that service personnel feel that there is support available to them should 
they suffer psychiatric or physical injury. However service personnel and their families 
say they are not getting the help and support they need.44 Imposing a moral or legal duty 
of care upon the MoD to care for service personnel during and after combat could see a 
change in the way that PTSD is detected and treated and could result in less severe cases 
of the condition.  
                                                                 
41 S Rayment, ‘Army failed my Soldier son over breakdown, claims father’ Telegraph (London, 25 
February 2012) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defenc e/9105823/Army-failed-my-soldier-
son-over-breakdown-claims-father.html> accessed 5 March 2013 
42 R Scorer, ‘Casualties of War’ (2009) 159 New Law Journal 1 
43 Anon, ‘MoD fails traumatised soldiers’ (BBC News, 8 September 2009) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/8242465.stm> accessed 5 March 2013 
44 A Stickler, ‘Injured veterans criticise lack of help’ (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 9 August 
2012) 
<http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/08/09/help-for-heroes-and-mod-criticised-by-injured-
troops/> accessed 5 March 2013 
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 The only assured form of help injured service personnel will receive is that from the 
Armed Forces Compensation Scheme (AFCS) which seeks to compensate those injured 
as a result of conflict operations. However, the AFCS has also received wide criticism 
from service personnel, their families and charities, such as the Royal British Legion. 
The criticisms of the AFCS will be analysed in Chapter 8. 
1.3. Conclusion 
 It is clear that there are many complaints against the MoD in relation to the safety, care 
and support that service personnel receive during and after combat. Inadequate or lack 
of equipment can lead to the deaths and serious injuries of service personnel that could 
have been avoided had the correct equipment been supplied. ‘The best possible 
equipment and care should be made available, and no life should be lost through an 
avoidable logistic failing.’45 This is embedded as part of the military covenant, which is 
the Government’s moral duty of care to service personnel. Arguably, and this is the 
central question for the present thesis, the Government and the MoD may well have 
failed in this moral  duty of care in instances where they have not supplied enough body 
armour or sent service personnel out in Snatch Land Rovers or in the Nimrod aircraft. It 
could be argued that instances where service personnel have suffered PTSD, the MoD 
have failed to detect and provide treatment for it. In order to determine whether the 
MoD can be held liable for such failures we must now turn to examining the law on the 
duty of care. 
                                                                 
45 ‘Army Doctrine Publication: Operations’ (Ministry of Defence, 2000) ch2 pg 9-2 
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Chapter Two 
A Duty of Care 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the English law of negligence with respect to 
how we approach the question of whether a duty of care exists. A three-stage test needs 
to be established in order for a duty of care to be placed upon a defendant. The third test 
i.e. of fair, just and reasonableness, is particularly relevant in cases where a negligence 
claim arises against a public body including the MoD as it is harder to establish, and has 
been subject to legal debate in the courts. Does the third test make it difficult for a duty 
of care to be established by the MoD in combat operations or in the planning and 
preparation of such operations? In order to answer this question the aspects needed to 
establish a duty of care must be considered. 
2.1. Establishing a duty of care 
 
The idea of a duty of care refers to the circumstances and relationships which the law 
recognises as giving rise to a legal duty of care. If a defendant is proven to have broken 
that duty of care, then they could be liable in negligence law for damages to the 
claimant.46 Therefore, it is necessary for the claimant to show that the defendant 
breached the duty of care.  
In order for an action in negligence to succeed the claimant must satisfy three 
elements that; the defendant owes the claimant a duty of care; the defendant has 
breached that duty of care and that, as a result of the defendant’s breach, the claimant 
has suffered damage.47 
Whether it is ‘just’ for a duty of care to be imposed upon the defendant depends not 
only on the concepts of foreseeability and proximity but also the concept of 
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reasonableness, which recognises that it is necessary to take into account other 
considerations of justice between the parties.48 These additional factors under the 
reasonableness concept concern the relationship between the parties and the risk in 
question, such as whether it is clear from the relationship between the defendant and the 
claimant that a duty of care would bear an unreasonable burden on the defendant.49 One 
such relationship that may provide for such a duty to arise is that of employer and 
employee, as an employer owes his employees a duty to take reasonable care to protect 
them from a foreseeable risk of injury.50 Whether a duty of care may arise in such a 
relationship in special cases such as police and the armed forces will be analysed later in 
chapters 3 and 4, but in order for such an analysis to be clear the thesis must first set out 
the essential elements for establishing a duty of care in negligence. 
The famous case of Donoghue v Stevenson51 established the liability of a 
manufacturer in negligence for injury sustained by the consumer of a product. The case 
formulated a general principle, namely the ‘neighbour principle’ in which a legal duty to 
take care could be determined.52 Lord Atkin set out the concept of the neighbour 
principle, stating that; 
You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can 
reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who then in law is 
my neighbour? The answer seems to be persons who are so closely and directly 
affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as 
being so affected when I am directing my mind to an act or omission which are 
called in question.53 
 
Lord Atkin’s account of the scope of negligence identifies two of the three key concepts 
mentioned previously, foreseeability and proximity. This meant that a duty of care 
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could be owed where the defendant ought to have reasonably foreseen that his failure to 
take care may cause injury to another, and that a duty of care would be owed if the 
claimant was directly affected by the defendant’s conduct, therefore showing a degree 
of proximity.54 The neighbour principle, established in Donoghue, was the basis in 
which a duty of care was to be decided by the courts and was reformulated by the later 
case of Anns v Merton LBC.55  
The case of Anns produced a two-stage test in which to establish whether a duty of care 
is owed; 
A prima facia duty of care is owed if the harm suffered by the claimant was a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s conduct and there was a 
relationship of proximity between the defendant and those to whom a duty of 
care is claimed to be owed56 
 
This two-stage test changed the applicability of the neighbour principle as after Anns the 
neighbour test would apply unless there were policy reasons for excluding it, whereas 
Donoghue used the test to justify new areas of liability where there were policy reasons 
for creating them.57 Donoghue was criticised for its simplicity in its approach to a duty 
of care and for not considering the problematic principle of policy.58 However, Anns 
fared less well than Donoghue and was denounced as judicial legislation. This was 
because the court in Anns created an entirely new principle in the form of a two-stage 
test, which is parliament’s function, rather than merely interpreting it, which is the 
court’s function. Effectively this resulted in Anns being overruled by the House of 
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Lords in Murphy v Brentwood District Council,59 and was replaced as the test for the 
duty of care by Caparo Industries v Dickman.60 
The Caparo case is now the leading case for deciding whether a duty of care would 
be owed and introduced a new three-stage test for establishing liability; foreseeability, 
whether the damage or loss was foreseeable; proximity, whether the relationship 
between the wrongdoer and the victim was sufficiently close; and fair, just and 
reasonableness, whether it is just and reasonable to impose a duty of care in the 
circumstances.61 If all three stages of Caparo can be established then it will be 
recognised that a duty of care does exist and therefore the defendant would be liable in 
tort for negligence. The thesis will now turn to the three-stage test in more detail. 
2.2 Foreseeability 
As already discussed the elements of the foreseeability test have their foundations in the 
Donoghue case in which the court developed the neighbour principle for establishing a 
duty of care. This was later replaced by the three-stage test set out in Caparo v 
Dickman62 in which Lord Justice Bingham, in relation to the first test of foreseeability, 
said; ‘it is common ground that reasonable foreseeability, although a necessary, is not a 
sufficient condition of the existence of a duty of care.’63 Essentially it is not for the 
courts to ask what the defendant actually did see but whether a person in the defendant’s 
position would have foreseen the risk of damage.64 Therefore, the standard of conduct 
in negligence is measured by what the reasonable prudent man would do under the 
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circumstances.65 The reasonable person by whom the standard of care in negligence is 
established is based upon all the characteristics of the person who has allegedly caused 
the conduct, which in essence brings the reasonable person in closer alignment with the 
actual person.66 The development of the reasonable person analogy enables fault to be 
determined and sets a threshold for liability to arise in negligence and enables the 
foreseeability test to be judged by some standard. 
A fundamental element of liability for negligence is the knowledge of which the 
defendant had or ought to have had at the time. It is presupposed that the defendant 
either foresees a risk of injury, or could foresee it if he had conducted himself as a 
reasonable prudent man would have done in the circumstances.67 Therefore, the 
foreseeability of harm must depend on the knowledge which the defendant had or ought 
to have had at the time. This was recognised by the court in the case of Vaughan v 
Menlove68 where the defendant (Menlove) built a hayrick near the boundary of his 
property close to the claimant’s cottages. Menlove was warned on several occasions that 
the hayrick was a fire hazard but ignored all warnings and built a chimney through the 
rick. As a result the rick ignited by the heat generated and consequently spread and set 
fire to the claimant’s cottages. 
The court found that as a landowner Menlove had a duty of care to enjoy his property 
ensuring that it did not injure that of his neighbour, and according to that rule Menlove 
would be liable for the consequences of his own negligence.69 Although Menlove did 
not himself light the fire he was still negligent as he had been warned and had 
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knowledge that hay will ferment and ignite if not carefully stacked.70 This case is an 
example of both concepts of foreseeability and knowledge as the defendant had 
knowledge of what would happen if the hayrick was not properly stacked and should 
have therefore foreseen the consequences of his actions. 
As Lord Oliver explained in Caparo v Dickman, foreseeability ‘is not only a duty to 
take care, but a duty to avoid causing to the claimant damage of the particular kind 
which he has in fact sustained.’71 Providing the defendant would not reasonably foresee 
the damage or have knowledge that could have prevented the damage, a duty of care 
would not be established under the first test of foreseeability. The Court of Appeal was 
faced with this issue in Bhamra v Dubb72 where the claimant’s husband, who had a 
severe allergy to eggs, collapsed and died after unknowingly eating a dish containing 
eggs at a Sikh wedding. The Sikh religion bans its followers from eating certain foods 
including eggs. The defendant, who was a caterer, knew this but it appeared that the 
food ran out and the defendant had sourced extra food from another supplier, which 
contained eggs. The Court of Appeal held that the defendant was under a duty not to 
serve food with eggs, as it was a Sikh event and that the defendant should have known 
that some people would be allergic to eggs and would suffer serious injury if they ate 
foods containing them,73 therefore finding that a duty of care was owed by the 
defendant not to cause physical harm by serving eggs to Sikhs. 
With regard to establishing the foreseeability test, when the claimant is a serving 
soldier in the armed forces and the negligence claim is against the MoD, the legal case 
of Sergeant Steven Roberts will be considered. Sergeant Steven Roberts was killed on 
patrol in Iraq in 2003 after he was told to hand over his body armour to a fellow 
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serviceman.  The MoD recognised that supply failures were to blame for Sergeant 
Robert’s death, as if there had been enough body armour for all service personnel 
Sergeant Robert’s death would have been avoided. As the MoD had admitted liability 
for not providing sufficient body armour in this case, there was no need to establish any 
test for negligence.74 However what if the MoD had not admitted liability? 
It is reasonably foreseeable that while out on patrol in Iraq, without body armour, 
there is an increased risk of death or serious injury if a member of the armed forces was 
to be hit by a bullet. Pathologists found that had Sergeant Roberts been wearing the 
body armour he would have survived, therefore the act of the MoD not to supply 
enough body armour created a real and immediate risk to life by exposing Sergeant 
Robert’s to increased danger.75 
A reasonable prudent man would have foreseen that while out on patrol a serving 
soldier would be more vulnerable against a bullet if they had no body armour. Service 
personnel have every reason to rely upon the MoD to provide them with adequate 
equipment where practicable and to care and support them both on and off the 
battlefield. The MoD should have foreseen that the likelihood of not providing 
sufficient body armour would result in a member of the armed forces being seriously 
injured or killed. Thus the test for foreseeability would be established in these 
circumstances. Once foreseeability has been recognised it is necessary to turn to the 
second test of proximity to see if the claimant was so closely affected by the defendant’s 
conduct that liability could arise.  
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2.3. Proximity 
The concept of the second test in Caparo of proximity is essentially concerned with the 
relationship between the defendant and the claimant in order to answer the question of 
whether the claimant was so closely and directly affected by the defendant’s conduct.76 
In identifying proximity, Chris Whitting suggested that ‘proximity seeks to determine 
whether, prior to the defendant’s failure in care, there existed between the parties 
“significant causal pathways” by which the defendant’s conduct “might have resulted in 
harm to the claimant.”77 Therefore the degree of closeness the law requires before 
imposing a duty of care depends on what type of damage the claimant suffers. The 
courts require a closer relationship between the defendant and the claimant in cases such 
as psychiatric injury, whereas in cases of physical injury the degree of proximity is 
more easily satisfied.78 
An example of a relationship that would satisfy the closeness the law requires 
between the defendant and the claimant is that of employer and employee discussed 
earlier in this chapter. A breach of an employer’s duty to take reasonable care of their 
employees by providing adequate equipment under the Health and Safety at Work Act 
1974, may give rise to a claim against them in negligence.79  
An example of a case that satisfies the relationship of proximity is that of Watson v 
British Boxing Board of Control80 where the claimant was a professional boxer who 
suffered severe brain damage after being injured during a bout. He sued the board on the 
basis that if they had made sufficient safety arrangements and made immediate medical 
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attention available at ringside then his injuries would have been less severe. It was held 
by the Court of Appeal that there was sufficient proximity between Watson and the 
board to give rise to a duty of care as the board had almost complete control and 
responsibility for a situation that could result in harm to Watson and that the board did 
not exercise such reasonable care.81 
As long as there is a sufficient closeness between the defendant and the claimant, the 
test for establishing proximity will always be satisfied. 
Referring the test of proximity back to the case example above of Sergeant Roberts, 
would the MoD be in close enough proximity in order for a duty of care to be 
established? 
As a serving soldier Sergeant Roberts was under the employment of the MoD, on 
active duty in Iraq. This establishes a contractual relationship of that of an employer and 
employee in which the MoD has a legal duty to protect, like any other employer. The 
failure of the MoD to provide sufficient equipment contributed to the death of Sergeant 
Roberts and thus there is sufficient proximity between Sergeant Roberts and the MoD. 
Cases that arise from inadequate equipment within the armed forces may be able to 
satisfy the requirements of proximity because of the employer, employee relationship 
but immunities put in place for the MoD make it difficult for a duty of care to be 
established in relation to the third test of Caparo.  
The third test set out in Caparo of fair, just and reasonableness seems to be the test 
that may be particularly challenging for service personnel as it is likely to hinder any 
prospects of the MoD being held liable in tort for a breach of a duty of care. This is 
because whilst most cases are able to satisfy the first and second tests of foreseeability 
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and proximity, the courts may hold that there are sound public policy reasons for 
denying the claim and hence the third test must be satisfied. 
2.4. Fair, Just and Reasonable 
Although foreseeability and proximity are central issues in deciding whether a duty of 
care should be established, it is not always just for a duty to be imposed which is where 
the third test of fair, just and reasonable comes in. In some cases, it may not be deemed 
to be just to impose a duty of care upon the MoD even though the tests of foreseeability 
and proximity have been established.82 This was recognised by Lord Bridge of Harwich 
in Caparo, that in addition to foreseeability and proximity; ‘the situation should be one 
in which the court considers it fair, just and reasonable that the law should impose a 
duty of a given scope upon the one party for the benefit of the other’.83 This 
requirement often overlaps with the previous two tests. For example, in the Watson case 
discussed above, it was just and reasonable to hold the boxing board liable for failing to 
supervise a match properly and to provide reasonable care in the event of an injury, 
therefore satisfying all three tests. 
The courts are hesitant to impose a duty of care if it would impose an unreasonable 
and unfair burden on any defendant. The prospect of damage i.e. harm, is weighed 
against the preventative measures needed in order to reduce the risk of the harm 
occurring, thus taking a cost/benefit analysis in establishing whether or not a duty of 
care should be owed. If the courts are of the view that imposing a duty of care would 
lead to a ‘flood’ of claims against the defendant then policy may dictate that a duty of 
care should be denied so that the defendant can continue to function.84 Generally, there 
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are two justifications for the third test of Caparo, the first being the ‘floodgates 
argument’ where imposing a duty of care in certain situations may lead to a sharp rise in 
negligence claims contrary to policy imperatives including the interest in avoiding 
excessive levels of litigation; the second being that imposing a duty of care may lead to 
the rendering of certain operations and activities ineffective as the fear of a negligence 
claim hinders appropriate military decision making.  
This chapter has shown that it is straightforward in most cases to establish 
foreseeability and proximity in order for a duty of care to arise. However the third test 
of fair, just and reasonableness is much harder to establish. This is especially the case if 
a negligence claim is against a public body as the courts do not wish to place 
unreasonable burden on the defendants of such cases.  
Again taking the case of Sergeant Roberts, the absence of the protection from the 
body armour exposed him to a greater risk of injury or death from an attack or threat of 
attack. However as Sergeant Roberts was working in Iraq taking part in combat 
operations at the time he was killed, he automatically fell within the legal definition of 
combat as stated in Bici v Ministry of Defence, which will be discussed in chapter three. 
As a consequence of Robert’s falling into this definition, the MoD was covered by the 
doctrine of combat immunity. This meant that no claim in tort can arise against them for 
injuries sustained in combat. The restriction of the third test i.e. fair, just and reasonable, 
will be examined in more detail in chapter four when the thesis will discuss public 
liability in relation to the armed forces and how this affects a soldier’s claim against the 
MoD. 
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2.5. Conclusion 
In order for any negligence claim to succeed it must be shown that there was a duty of 
care owed by the defendant and that the duty of care had been breached causing damage 
to the claimant. To establish these concepts of a duty of care the three stage test in 
Caparo was analysed in order to show whether there was foreseeability, proximity and 
if it was fair, just and reasonable for a duty of care to be owed by the defendant.  It 
seems from analysing the three tests that there would be no duty of care, in tort, owed 
by the MoD to service personnel on operations as the courts do not find it fair, just or 
reasonable to impose such a duty. 
The impositions of the third stage test have been the reason for the MoD not being 
liable for negligence as the courts allow for the blanket defence of combat immunity. It 
is to this legal doctrine that this thesis will now turn, commencing with consideration of 
the nature of this doctrine in conflict operations. 
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Chapter Three 
The limitations of Combat Immunity 
 
To recap, while it may be straightforward to establish foreseeability and sufficient 
proximity for a duty of care to arise against the MoD, the third test of fair, just and 
reasonable has not been explored because of the effects combat immunity has on 
conflict operations. Combat immunity has been granted to the MoD under the Crown 
Proceedings (Armed Forces) Act 1987 and the Crown Proceedings Act 1947. This 
doctrine enables the Crown and its bodies to be immune from a negligence action 
arising as a result of combat. However despite this, a question arises as to whether the 
MoD could successfully be held liable for negligent acts arising from combat in certain 
situations or whether the defence of combat immunity proves fatal to all negligence 
actions against the MoD in times of conflict. This legal issue of combat immunity will 
be examined in the light of three influential cases which have considered the scope of 
the duty of care in actual combat. 
3.1. Legal position of the Crown and its bodies 
The legal position of the Crown and its bodies such as the MoD has been criticised for 
allowing the MoD to avoid legal responsibility for service personnel being injured 
during combat operations. The defence of combat immunity means that the MoD will 
have immunity from liability for damages for injuries or deaths sustained in combat laid 
out in the provisions of the Crown Proceedings (Armed Forces) Act 1987, which will be 
set out later in the chapter. 
Crown immunity originally derived from the saying that ‘the king can do no wrong’ 
which was taken by judges to mean that the Crown was not bound by statute.85 This was 
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the approach the courts took prior to the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 in which it was 
not possible for individuals to sue the Crown and its bodies based on the above 
principle. The enactment of the 1947 Act enabled the Crown to be held generally liable 
in tort for acts of negligence. However, immunity was retained through section 10 (1) of 
the 1947 Act in relation to members of the armed forces.86 It provided that: 
No act or omission by a member of the armed forces will render either the 
individual or the Crown liable in tort for the death or serious injury of another 
member of the armed forces.87 
 
The effect of section 10 is clear in that where a member of the armed forces injures or 
kills another member of the armed forces while on duty, or is injured or killed as a 
result of any ‘land, aircraft or vehicle used by the armed forces, no liability in tort shall 
arise against the Crown’.88 This led to growing dissatisfaction given that the provisions 
set out in section 10 were acting as a bar to claims in tort, making it impossible for 
service personnel to formulate a claim against the MoD, even under peacetime 
conditions.89 
This position remained until the enactment of the Crown Proceedings (Armed 
Forces) Act 1987, which removed the blanket protection of section 10. Section 1 of the 
1987 Act abolished the effect of section 10 in respect of injuries and deaths suffered as a 
result of acts or omissions committed after the date of the new 1987 Act. Subject to 
combat immunity, this enabled service personnel, like any other employee, to be able to 
sue the MoD for compensation when they have been injured as a result of negligence.90 
The Act stated: 
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The Crown shall be subject to all those liabilities in tort, in respect of torts 
committed by its servants or agents and in respect of any breach of those duties 
which a person owes to his servants or agents at common law by reason of their 
employment.91 
 
Effectively the provision meant that where no order was made to revive section 10, the 
Crown could be liable for negligence or for the failure to provide a safe system of 
work.92 The effect of section 2 of the 1987 Act, however, provided for the revival of 
section 10 in times of ‘immediate national danger’ or ‘for the purposes of any warlike 
operations in any part of the world outside the United Kingdom’.93 This section was 
introduced with a comment by Winston Churchill MP (Davyhulme) that it would be 
‘unrealistic to expect servicemen engaged in battle to have the right to sue their fellow 
servicemen or officers for negligence’.94 
The consequence of this is that successful applications for a negligence claim by 
injured service personnel have been very few in number and the implications of this 
effective legal bar will require exploration and evaluation. To understand the 
development and current definition of combat immunity, this thesis will now analyse 
the judgments in three influential cases, namely, Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence95, 
Multiple Claimants v Ministry of Defence96 and Bici v Ministry of Defence.97 Each will 
now be examined in turn to clarify important doctrinal questions on how far the defence 
of combat immunity extends and why. 
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3.2. Combat Immunity  
In Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence,98the claimant was a serving soldier in the Royal 
Regiment of Artillery. He was part of a team manning a Howitzer gun in the course of 
the Gulf War. Mulcahy brought a tortious claim against the MoD, alleging that he had 
suffered personal injury as a result of the negligence of the gun commander while the 
gun was firing live rounds into Iraq.99 The action was subsequently struck out on the 
ground of combat immunity. Until the decision in Mulcahy there had been no discussion 
of combat immunity in English law.100 Hence it is worth discussing the use of authority 
in this case. 
The MoD sought to establish the principle of combat immunity by referring to three 
cases, namely, Shaw Savill and Albion Co. Ltd v The Commonwealth101, Burmah Oil 
Co. Ltd v Lord Advocate102 and Hughes v National Union of Mineworkers.103 
The primary claim made by Mulcahy was that the defendants were liable for the 
negligence of the commander, Sergeant Warren. In respect of the relevant legislation of 
the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 and the Crown Proceedings (Armed Forces) Act 1987, 
section 10 was not revived for the purposes of the Gulf War in this case.104 Hence, since 
no statutory immunity, Mulcahy now had to demonstrate that a duty of care at common 
law was owed to him by the MoD and that no common law combat immunity existed. It 
had to be established by the courts whether the firing of the Howitzer gun into Iraq 
constituted hostilities against the enemy, and ‘whether the degree of involvement in 
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warlike activities was such to allow the Crown to argue that it was in fact a heat of 
battle situation, and if it was the question would then be whether there was onus of 
proof at civil law.105 This raised the question of interpretation as to the meaning of what 
would constitute a heat of battle situation, and hence those situations that fall inside, 
outside and on the borders of the applicable legal test. 
Mulcahy argued that a duty of care owed by the MoD should not be precluded from 
applying to a member of the armed forces in wartime given that the Secretary of State 
had not revived section 10 for the purposes of the Gulf War. Support for such an 
approach had previously been expressed by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in E (A Minor) v 
Dorset County Council106 where he stated; ‘where the law is not settled but is in a state 
of development it is normally appropriate to decide novel questions on hypothetical 
facts’.107 The purpose of section 10 was to prevent proceedings being brought in respect 
of death or serious injury at any time to a member of the armed forces caused by 
negligence of another member of the armed forces. The Secretary of State did not revive 
section 10 and therefore the argument was that the MoD should not be able to rely upon 
section 10 for the purposes of the Iraq war. 
The trial judge concluded that Mulcahy was in a war zone taking part in warlike 
operations and was a member of the gun crew engaged in firing shells on enemy targets. 
It was accepted by the MoD that there was no direct English common law to support the 
proposition that no duty of care in tort is owed by one soldier to another when engaging 
the enemy in battle conditions.108 Therefore in the absence of English case law the 
courts chose to rely upon decisions by the High Court in earlier Commonwealth law in 
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Shaw Savill, the dicta in the Scottish case of Burmah Oil and the Hughes case which 
involved a police officer who was injured while on operational duty. 
The first case which was relied upon by the MoD was Shaw Savill. Here the claimant 
sued the Commonwealth of Australia for damages as a result of a collision that occurred 
between H.M.A.S. Adelaide and a motor vessel owned by the claimants during active 
naval operations. The Commonwealth in their defence pleaded that ‘the claimants’ 
supposed cause of action consisted solely in acts, matters and things done or occurring 
in the course of active naval operations against the King’s enemies by the armed forces 
of the Commonwealth’.109 The essence of the Commonwealth’s claim was that they 
were engaged in a state of war at the time of the collision, following from which they 
did not owe a duty of care to the claimants. 
In the course of judgments on whether a duty of care was owed if the warship was 
engaged on active operations, Dixon J suggested: 
It could hardly be maintained that during an actual engagement with the enemy the 
navigating officer of a King’s ship of war was under a common law duty of care to 
avoid harm to such non-combatant ships as might appear in the theatre of 
operations.110 
 
Therefore, if this interpretation is accepted and is interpreted as laying down a general 
rule that goes beyond the specific facts of the case and their immediate context, then it 
would undermine any claim that civil liability can arise for acts of negligence when 
engaged with the enemy by a member of the armed forces.111 Consequently, this would 
mean that the Crown and its bodies should not be held liable for negligence in combat 
situations, as it would be unjust to afford such a duty of care when operational decisions 
are made in the heat of battle. 
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However, in modern conflicts there are significant differences between actual 
operations against the enemy and other combatant services in times of war, such as 
peacekeeping and policing operations. In Shaw Savill, Dixon J appeared to accept a 
broad interpretation of military engagement with the enemy. Thus Dixon J further stated 
in his judgment that; ‘the principle of combat immunity cannot be limited to the 
presence of the enemy or to occasions when contact with the enemy has been 
established’.112 This meant that in Mulcahy the MoD could now rely upon the defence 
of combat immunity where there was no immediate contact or presence of the enemy 
i.e. firing practice before engagement, in situations such as the one set out in Mulcahy. 
This developed the law well beyond the point which had been made at first instance in 
Mulcahy suggesting that the claimant was not in an actual engagement with the enemy, 
as in Shaw Savill, and thus there was no hand to hand combat enabling the defendants to 
rely upon combat immunity. At first instance the court in Mulcahy adopted the principle 
laid out in Shaw Savill which extended to ‘attack and resistance, advance and retreat, 
pursuit and avoidance, reconnaissance and engagement’.113 This broad definition, 
involving a wide range of military activities falling short of actual armed conflict, had 
negative implications for Mulcahy’s claims. This was because the firing of the gun was 
held to constitute battle conditions as they were firing into Iraq even though there was 
no immediate presence or contact with the enemy. 
It was submitted on behalf of the claimant that some of the judgments in Shaw Savill 
went far beyond that which was justifiable in law. The claimant argued that the right 
approach would be to allow the claim to proceed and then, at trial, investigate the 
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particular circumstances surrounding the firing of the gun to ascertain whether there had 
been a breach of a duty of care.114 
As the soldiers were firing live rounds into Iraq the judge concluded that this 
constituted battle conditions for the purposes of the principle laid down in Shaw Savill 
and a further hearing of the facts at trial was not necessary. Since Shaw Savill was relied 
upon by the defendants, the Crown was not under a duty of care to the claimant. 
An alternative strand of authority which the MoD relied upon was the case of 
Hughes v National Union of Mineworkers.115 This case was tendered to support the 
proposition that no duty of care should be owed where critical decisions are made with 
little or no time for considered thought.116 The claimant in this case was a police officer 
posted in a support unit to assist the maintenance of public order where mineworkers on 
strike were picketing working miners. The claimant was injured as a result of a number 
of pickets falling on top of him. As a result of his injury the claimant brought a action 
against the Chief Constable of North Yorkshire for ‘negligence in causing, permitting or 
requiring the claimant to take up an unsupported and unprotected position as well as 
failing to operate a safe system of work’.117  The judge in his conclusions stated that in 
high-pressure circumstances, which involve physical danger where instant decisions 
have to be made, it would be unreasonable under public policy to ascribe tortious 
liability: 
... Critical decisions have to be made with little or no time for considered thought and 
where many individual officers may be in some sort of danger of physical injury of 
one kind or another.118 
 
This is part of a wider public policy argument as, for example, firemen who are in a 
rescue situation do not have time to stop and think and so they should not have to be 
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made liable for any actions made in that moment. However one issue is that if firemen 
were not supplied with adequate fire protective clothing and equipment, would it be 
reasonable then to impose a tortious liability on the employer? This issue will be 
examined in more detail in chapter four. 
In considering the case law relied upon in the Court of Appeal in Mulcahy the court 
could have decided the case in three ways, firstly, that a serving soldier would be held 
liable to another serving soldier in the heat of battle, secondly the MoD could be held 
liable for the actions of a serving soldier and thirdly no duty of care can arise in battle 
conditions so as to render either a serving soldier or the MoD liable. 
Neill LJ, in the Court of Appeal in the Mulcahy case, had accepted the interpretation 
of the precedent laid out in Shaw Savill that ‘during the course of hostilities no duty of 
care is owed by a member of the armed forces to civilians or their property, and so it 
must be even more apparent that no such duty is owed to another member of the armed 
forces’.119 
Furthermore, Neill LJ accepted that the scope of the duty of care, during the course 
of hostilities, is based on similar reasoning laid out in the Hughes case in that the ‘fear 
of a negligence claim would be likely to affect the task which the decisions intended to 
advance’.120 To hold that a member of the armed forces is negligent when engaging 
with the enemy could potentially undermine the running of operations. There is a 
similar argument made in favour of public bodies such as the police, that to impose a 
duty on them would make it difficult for them to exercise their duties properly. The 
judge in Hughes held that it would not be reasonable to hold a member of the armed 
forces liable in negligence while taking part in hostilities against the enemy, stating; ‘it 
could be highly detrimental to the conduct of military operations if each soldier had to 
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be conscious that, even in battle, he owed a duty of care to his comrade’.121 Neill LJ in 
Mulcahy also drew parallels with the following comments made in the Hughes case: 
If senior police officers are to be potentially liable to individual officers under their 
command if those individuals are injured by attacks from rioters, that would be 
significantly detrimental to the control of public order.122 
 
The Court of Appeal in Mulcahy held that to hold the MoD or a commander liable for 
the injuries sustained by service personnel on active operations would hinder the 
effective running of defence operations. 
Overall the judgments laid down in the Mulcahy case determined that the MoD were not 
to be held liable in tort for damages to the claimant. Neill LJ was clearly influenced by 
the Commonwealth case law and his conclusion referred to Gibbs C.J. in the Groves123 
case who had stated: 
To hold that there is no civil liability for injury caused by the negligence of persons 
in the course of actual engagement with the enemy seems to me to accord with 
common sense and sound policy.124 
 
Accordingly, there was no duty on the MoD, in the theatre of war, to maintain a safe 
system of work, in civil law, similar to that of a civilian employer within the UK. The 
Mulcahy case was the first common law case to embed the existence of combat 
immunity and create precedent that would bind future cases relating to negligence 
claims by service personnel. 
The second influential case noted in respect of combat immunity and the duty of care 
was Multiple Claimants v Ministry of Defence.125  This was a multi-party action brought 
by over 2000 personnel who claimed that the MoD was negligent in failing to take 
adequate steps to prevent the onset of psychiatric illness and to detect, diagnose and 
treat the illness. The claims were organised in two group actions, group one comprising 
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cases in which the alleged failure of the MoD occurred before 15th May 1987, the date 
from which the immunity conferred by section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 
was repealed; and group two comprising cases where the alleged failure of the MoD 
occurred after 15th May 1987.126 It was accepted by the MoD that they owed a duty 
prior to the 1987 Act except in relation to immediate operational decisions and actions 
taking place within a theatre of war.127 The claimants, however, argued that the MoD 
should have proactively detected PTSD during and after conflict, even when a soldier 
did not specifically report it and provide treatment for it in much the same way as they 
would treat a physical injury sustained in the course of combat.128 This proposition was 
rejected by the court which held that ‘the MoD owe a duty of care as an employer and 
as a provider of general and specialist medical services, but no higher standard of care 
was imposed’.129  
The claimants did not accept that the MoD was immune from action in relation to 
injuries sustained before 15th May 1987. The claimants contended first that statutory 
immunity did not extend to breaches of the duty owed to service personnel by the MoD 
as their employer, and secondly the injury suffered within the meaning of section 10(1) 
‘was not suffered wholly or exclusively on Crown land or while the claimants were on 
duty.’130  It was decided at first instance that the claimant’s failed in this argument on 
the basis of the House of Lords decision in Matthews v Ministry of Defence.131 Here it 
was stated that ‘section 10, in very many cases before 1987 and in cases of latent injury 
sustained before 1987, substituted a no-fault system of compensation for a claim for 
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damages’.132 The purpose of section 10, stated in the 1947 Act, was therefore to provide 
a system of compensation to service personnel which excluded a common law claim for 
damages against the MoD. The judge held that; ‘it would not have been wholly 
anomalous for employer’s liability to be excluded from that scheme’.133 This was 
because the Crown can only act by its servants or agents and therefore it is necessary to 
include employer’s liability in such situations.134  
Considerations of the general scope of section 10 immunity comprised a significant 
part of the judgment of Owen J. He approached this interpretive issue differently from 
the previous courts in Mulcahy, insisting the immunity was an exception to a generally 
valid principle of tortious liability. Hence it would seem that immunity had to be 
interpreted narrowly and not expansively. He stated; ‘it should of course be no wider 
than is necessary. It plainly applies when service personnel are engaged with the enemy 
in the course of hostilities’.135 Thus he decided that the judgment in the Shaw Savill case 
was correct in holding that the principle of combat immunity should cover ‘attack and 
resistance, advance and retreat, pursuit and avoidance, reconnaissance and engagement’. 
Each of these activities constituted engagements with the enemy during a period of 
active hostilities with the exception of the Shaw Savill case. 
The extent or ambit of combat immunity was of central importance in this case as it 
was in the previous cases, and as a result Owen J considered some of the issues which 
arose in relation to the Falklands War in order to consider whether immunity should be 
extended to the planning and preparation of operations. The claimants by now claimed 
that the MoD failed in briefing the soldiers adequately on what to expect, en route to the 
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Falkland Islands and failed to carry out operational debriefing on the result of the 
operation ‘at the earliest reasonable opportunity, whether in lull during battle, or 
following battle, campaign, attack or patrol’.136 
The court concluded that immunity did cover the MoD’s negligence in the planning 
and preparation of operations otherwise its removal would prevent the effective 
functioning of operations. Dixon J in Shaw Savill identified that the ‘military objective 
must override the interest of the individual’ so as not to prevent the effective 
functioning of operations.137 Owen J thus reaffirmed the pragmatic policy argument 
already noted when he stated that the ‘military cannot be constrained by the imposition 
of civil liability in the planning and preparation for such operations any more than in 
their execution’.138 The decision to include the ‘planning and preparation of operations’ 
within the immunity further limited members of the armed forces in their ability to 
make a claim in negligence. Importantly, to include ‘planning and preparation’ meant 
that all decisions on deployment of equipment came within the scope of the immunity. 
As a result any negligence claim made against the MoD that has arisen through the use 
of inadequate or defective combat-related equipment could be unsuccessful. This has 
proved to be an extension of huge significance in the context of the recent Iraq and 
Afghanistan conflicts. 
In practice, this resort to a policy justification widened the scope of combat 
immunity, ensuring that the MoD could not be held liable in tort for damages which 
occurred either during combat in the immediate theatre of war, nor during the planning 
and preparation of such operations. 
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In summary, whilst the Mulcahy case could be seen as having developed the doctrine 
of combat immunity from a Commonwealth precedent, this case certainly extended its 
scope to include even acts of planning and preparation, for merely potential or 
hypothetical future engagements such as training exercises.  
The third key development in the definition of combat immunity arose in the case of 
Bici v Ministry of Defence.139 It is important to discuss this case as it reduced the scope 
of the immunity which had previously been so heavily extended in the Multiple 
Claimants case. The High Court in Bici determined that the MoD would surely be held 
liable for negligence claims, made against them by service personnel who were injured, 
where they did not arise out of a ‘serious and imminent threat’.140 The judgment of Elias 
J in the Bici case rejected, for the first time, the MoD’s reliance on the defence of 
combat immunity. 
The case concerned personal injury claims made by Kosovo civilians against British 
soldiers. The soldiers were involved in a peacekeeping operation in Kosovo in respect 
of which they were welcomed by the inhabitants of Kosovo and were seen as liberators. 
It was the first Independence Day for eight years and crowds had gathered to celebrate 
the city’s liberation and were firing guns in celebration. The soldiers mis-read the 
situation and consequently fired upon the claimant’s car. This resulted in two of the 
passengers being killed and the remaining passengers claiming damages for their 
injuries.141 
It was alleged that the soldiers owed a duty of care to the injured Kosovo claimants 
to prevent personal injury and failed because they did not exercise reasonable care. The 
soldiers claimed to have acted in self-defence as they claimed they genuinely perceived 
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a threat of attack from one of the car’s occupants. The judge considered Lord Diplock in 
Attorney General for Northern Ireland’s Reference No 1142 in which he observed that a 
soldier has to act intuitively in high-pressure circumstances and to recognise that their 
actions are: 
Not undertaken in the calm and analytical atmosphere of the court room with the 
benefit of hindsight expounded at length the reasons for and against the kind and 
degree of force that was used by the accused.143 
 
These observations by Lord Diplock were similar to May J’s concluding judgment in 
the Hughes case where it was stated that public servants such as the police have to make 
decisions in high-pressure circumstances equivalent to that of a member of the armed 
forces on operations and therefore they should not be held liable in tort for damages. 
In relation to the defence claim that Fahri Bici was aiming a gun at the soldiers and 
therefore that they fired in self-defence, Mr Justice Elias concluded that the defendants 
could not rely on self-defence as neither the forensic nor witness evidence on the 
position of the gun supported the soldiers’ claim that Fahri Bici was facing them and 
aiming at them. This evidence was, therefore, fatal to the defendants argument that they 
believed themselves to be in danger as expert evidence showed that Fahri Bici was shot 
in the back and was not therefore facing the soldiers, suggesting that the threat of being 
shot by the claimant was not credible in the circumstances. 
In response to their claims the MoD raised two defences, combat immunity and no 
duty of care. The basis of combat immunity had been set out in the Shaw Savill case and 
broadened later in Mulcahy. However, the scope of combat immunity had been further 
widened by the Multiple Claimants case to cover the planning and preparation of 
operations. In his judgment Elias J held that combat immunity ‘is relied upon when a 
person is injured or their property is damaged or destroyed in circumstances where they 
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are the innocent victims of action arising out of combat’144 as in Mulcahy. The soldiers 
in Bici had already been found to have acted unlawfully; therefore where self-defence 
failed as a defence was the court going to sanction the MoD’s reliance on combat 
immunity? 
Whilst the soldiers were essentially carrying out policing and peacekeeping functions 
and might, from time to time, still become engaged in attack or threat of attack, Elias J 
found that; ‘any such threat in my view must be serious and imminent’145 in order for 
the defence of combat immunity to arise. This interpretation of the legal requirements or 
test reduced the scope of combat immunity closer to that which was first established in 
Mulcahy. Under this interpretation even where members of the armed forces are under 
attack, it would not necessarily follow that the doctrine of combat immunity would 
apply as a defence for the MoD unless such an attack was ‘serious and imminent’. This 
narrowed the scope of immunity which had previously been extended in the Multiple 
Claimants case. The Mulcahy case had established a legal foothold upon which cases 
such as Multiple Claimants and Bici then drew in this development of the doctrine. 
3.3. Conclusion 
To summarise, in the Mulcahy case the MoD still owed a duty of care to the claimant 
because section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 had not been revived for the 
purposes of the Gulf War. The MoD then relied upon the authorities of Shaw Savill, and 
the Hughes case in order to establish combat immunity notwithstanding the non-revival 
of section 10. Shaw Savill concluded that a duty of care was not owed in time of actual 
engagement with the enemy and that the principle extended to ‘attack and resistance, 
advance and retreat, pursuit and avoidance, reconnaissance and engagement’. This 
                                                                 
144 Bici v Ministry of Defence [2004] EWHC 786 (QB) at 101 
145 Ibid [102] 
42 
 
broad definition was adopted by the trial judge in Mulcahy and had negative 
implications for the claimant’s claim as the firing of the gun was held to constitute 
battle conditions. 
The trial judge also accepted that the scope of the duty of care was also dependent on 
similar reasoning laid out in the Hughes case that; ‘fear of a negligence claim would be 
likely to affect the decisions of the task which the decisions are intended to advance’.146 
Based on this interpretation, the trial judge in Mulcahy concluded that it would not be 
fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care between fellow servicemen operating 
in warlike conditions even though injury might be foreseeable.147 Thus the claims by 
Mulcahy failed. 
The definition of combat immunity had been extended in the Multiple Claimants 
case to provide the MoD with immunity in relation to the planning and preparation for 
combat. It was held that the MoD did not owe a duty to maintain a safe system of work 
when engaged with the enemy or in the planning and preparation of war.148 
However it could be said that the extension of this immunity was taken too far as it 
covered the planning and preparation of operations and police and peacekeeping 
operations so stated in Multiple Claimants. Mr Justice Elias in Bici narrowed the scope 
of immunity so that it would only apply if there was an attack or threat of attack which 
was ‘serious and imminent’.149 No legal definition of these words was given and it is 
assumed that their normal meanings apply.   
The duty of care issue discussed in the relevant case law of this chapter has been 
through a complex process of common law determination and the result is a tortious 
immunity which made it impossible for a member of the armed forces to bring a claim 
                                                                 
146 Hughes v National Union of Mineworkers [1991] ICR 669 
147 Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence [1996] QB 732 
148 Multiple Claimants v Ministry of Defence [2003] EWHC 1134 QB 
149 Bici v Ministry of Defence [2004] EWHC 786 (QB) at 102 
43 
 
against the MoD in relation to deaths or serious injuries sustained as a result of armed 
conflict. 
Because of the significant effect of combat immunity it is necessary to turn to public 
policy arguments which drove the developments of combat immunity and see if they 
stand up to scrutiny.  
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Chapter Four 
Public Policy Issues 
 
As shown in the previous chapters where negligence is concerned the English courts 
have been protective of the MoD in relation to claims made against them by members of 
the armed forces. This protective barrier to claims of negligence exists in other public 
services because the common law has resorted to a public policy based protection of the 
police, fire service and emergency services. Many arguments rooted in public policy 
concerns have sought to significantly limit liability, but would increased liability in fact 
lead to a defensive approach?  
This chapter will analyse these public policy issues and determine whether it is fair, 
just and reasonable to impose a duty of care on the armed forces where it could be 
argued that they have failed to provide adequate equipment. 
4.1. Defensive practice argument 
The extent to which public bodies are to be held liable in negligence has been regularly 
revisited by the English courts. However the courts have yet to provide clarity and 
consistency to the principles.150 While the courts acknowledge that the principal 
obligation when dealing with a negligence claim is to provide a remedy to the victim, 
there are a number of public policy arguments set against this. The public policy 
arguments are as follows; liability would lead to the inefficient use of public resources, 
time and money; it would lead to a flood of claims against the public body and it would 
lead to the public body acting in a defensive frame of mind. These public policy 
arguments have been deployed to deny public body liability as they set a demanding 
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standard for demonstrating that a public body has acted negligently.151  The latter of the 
policy arguments above concerns two arguments on the impact of liability. Firstly, there 
is the argument that liability would lead public bodies to act in a detrimental frame of 
mind when carrying out their functions and secondly, in contrast to the first argument, it 
could be argued that liability would improve performance and lead to a higher standard 
of performance by public bodies.   
The courts have adopted different methods for limiting public authority liability in 
negligence, and the issue of public policy first emerged as a significant limitation in Hill 
v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire152 where the mother of the latest victim of the 
serial killer, the ‘Yorkshire Ripper’, brought an action against the police for negligently 
failing to identify and capture the killer before he had chance to murder her daughter.153 
The claim failed for two reasons; firstly there was not sufficient proximity between the 
police and her daughter; secondly the claim was defeated by public policy arguments of 
the need to avoid defensive practice and diversion of police resources.154 Giving the 
leading speech of the House in Hill, Lord Keith of Kinkel acknowledged that liability 
could improve the standards of public bodies, stating: 
Potential existence of such liability may in many instances be in the general public 
interest, as tending towards the observance of a higher standard of care in the 
carrying on of various types of activity.155 
 
However he later rejected this possibility on the basis that: 
‘it would be contrary to public policy to allow the action to proceed because the 
imposition of a duty of care would not be in the public interest; the imposition of 
liability may lead to the exercise of a function being carried out detrimentally; and a 
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great deal of police time and expense would have to be invested in the preparation of 
a defence in action’156 
 
Lord Keith did not think that imposing liability in those circumstances on the police 
force would improve the standard of care or motivation when carrying out police 
functions and therefore the police should be immune from such action. 
The Hill case was interpreted as a doctrine of immunity for the police from 
negligence actions arising from activities aimed at the suppression and investigation of 
crime and was later extended in the Hughes157 case to include operational decisions. 
The Hill case represented an illustration of tension between the broad issues of policy 
and the imposition of a duty of care, and consequently deterred the majority of actions 
made against the police.  
The reasoning of Lord Keith in the Hill case can be appreciated upon the facts as it 
would be undesirable to subject the police to a complex police investigation if every 
family member of people killed by a serial killer were to bring a case against them (and 
succeed). However, it has not been made clear that the imposition of negligence liability 
would result in investigations being conducted in a detrimental manner or that it would 
open up a potential ‘flood’ of claims, arguments which will be examined later on in this 
chapter. 
Nevertheless, Lord Keith’s public policy principle has been applied throughout the 
courts, even in cases where police negligence was more apparent. In Brooks v 
Commissioner of Police158 the claimant was a black youth who had witnessed the 
murder of his friend, Stephen Lawrence. A subsequent police enquiry found that the 
police had not properly dealt with the claimant as the claimant had been; ‘stereotyped as 
a young black man exhibiting unpleasant hostility and agitation, and whose condition 
                                                                 
156 J Hartsthorne, N Smith and R Everton, ‘Caparo under fire: the study into the effects upon the fire 
service of l iability in negligence’ (2000) 63:4 Modern Law Review 502 
157 Hughes v National Union of Mineworkers [2001] 4 All  ER 278 
158 [2005] UKHL 24 
47 
 
and status simply did not need further examination or understanding.’159 As such the 
claimant brought a negligence claim against the police, alleging that they owed him a 
duty of care to take reasonable steps to assess whether he had been a victim of a crime 
and afford him appropriate support and assistance.160 
However, upon the reasoning of Hill, Lord Steyn  held that no such duty of care 
could be owed to the claimant, as although it is desirable for the police to treat victims 
of crime appropriately, ‘to convert that ethical value into general legal duties of care ... 
would be going too far.’161 
The Brooks case should not have been dealt with under the Hill principle as there 
were strong reasons for imposing a duty of care based on the Caparo principles of 
foreseeability, proximity and fair, just and reasonableness. Furthermore the Hill case 
stemmed from a third party liability action and the statements made on public policy 
reasoning were specific to that case, and should not have been used to illuminate a duty 
of care in the Brooks case where it was clear that the police had acted negligently 
towards the claimant. 
The public policy arguments set out in Hill are just that, arguments, as the court did 
not base its decisions on factual evidence, but upon the legal submissions of counsel and 
the comments of the judges, all based on speculation.162 Public policy arguments are all 
aspects of the third limb of the Caparo test on whether it would be fair, just and 
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reasonable to impose a duty of care and these arguments include whether the imposition 
of a duty of care would lead to defensive practices and a diversion of resources.163  
There is nothing wrong with somebody acting more cautiously, thus improving the 
standard of care and avoiding unnecessary harm to others. Questions could be raised as 
to why a duty of care would make public bodies act in a unnecessarily careful manner 
instead of encouraging them to exercise the ordinary standard of care which would be 
sufficient and protect them from liability. On the other hand it could also be said that 
not holding a public body liable for negligent conduct could make them more 
complacent in the exercise of their duties and therefore their standard of care could 
deteriorate.164 One idea of the defensive practice argument is that it will take extra time 
and resources to illuminate the risks that could lead to a negligence claim arising against 
a public body. 
The courts will not generally interfere with the decisions public bodies make when 
weighing up public policy issues as the courts are not competent to determine whether 
policy matters have been assessed with proper care, as those issues are non-
justiciable.165 Lord Browne-Wilkinson in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council166 
said that non-justiciable issues would include; ‘... the allocation of finite financial 
resources ... or ... the balance between pursuing desirable social claims as against the 
risk of the public inherent in doing so.’167  The MoD have argued that equipment 
procurement decisions include matters of public policy and as such are non-justiciable 
and therefore it should not be for the courts to decide on such matters.168 However 
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would a duty of care in such circumstances impose an unreasonable burden on the 
MoD?  
4.2. Would a duty of care impose an unreasonable burden on the 
Ministry of Defence in combat? 
The main issues that arise when discussing the imposition of negligence liability on 
public bodies and particularly upon the MoD is whether imposing a duty of care would 
create an unreasonable burden on the defendant, so much so, that it affects the diversion 
of resources, time and money and leads to public bodies carrying out their functions in a 
defensive frame of mind. The diversion of resources argument suggests two ways in 
which a public body could lose assets, firstly, by taking defensive measures to avoid 
litigation and secondly, by having to pay actual damages as a result of negligent 
conduct. 
In regard to the latter public policy argument Lord Neuberger in Smith v Ministry of 
Defence169 was of the opinion that the policy argument established in the Hill case 
‘affords no warrant for denying the existence of a duty of care,’170 further stating that: 
The fact that policy considerations and the scarcity of resources will arise in relation 
to allegations of negligence against the MoD provides no basis for distinguishing the 
MoD from any other public body in relation to the duty it owes to its employees...171  
 
The MoD have argued both in this case and previous cases already discussed in chapter 
three that they owe no duty of care to members of the armed forces for deaths or injuries 
arising out of combat. However it should not be disputed that the MoD owes a duty of 
care at common law to members of the armed forces as their employer. The Health and 
Safety at Work Act 1974 and subsequent secondary legislation impose statutory duties 
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upon the MoD to provide a ‘safe system of work’,172 and to construct or adapt work 
equipment so that it is fit for purpose under the Provision and Use of Work Equipment 
Regulations 1998 (PUWER).173 The territorial scope of these regulations however is 
limited to Great Britain and therefore they do not extend to operational conflicts abroad. 
Therefore would these regulations apply to the MoD in relation to equipment decisions 
made long before any battle? 
Two main cases came before the Court of Appeal in October 2012. The first claim, 
known as the Challenger claims, was brought by Deborah Albutt for the death of Steven 
Albutt, and by Daniel Twiddy and Andrew Julian who were both injured in the same 
incident as Steven Albutt.174 The second case was brought by Courtney Ellis, a minor, 
by her litigation friend Karla Ellis, and by Karla Ellis on her own behalf for the death of 
Private Ellis, known as the Ellis claims.175 The Challenger claims alleged that the MoD 
was in breach of a duty of care as an employer to provide safe equipment and 
technology, while the Ellis claims allege that the MoD failed to provide better armoured 
vehicles and failed to ensure that element A had been fitted to the Snatch Land Rover. 
As the claims related to inadequate equipment they gave rise to the issues of 
procurement. 
As such the MoD argued that no duty of care should be imposed on them in relation to 
the procurement of equipment as such issues were not justiciable, stating; 
‘Such issues involve consideration of questions as to the scarcity and allocation of 
resources and questions of policy… The courts ought not to trespass into such 
territory, which is the province of those in command, and of politicians answerable to 
parliament.’176 
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The MoD also sought to rely on combat immunity to argue that the courts could not 
adjudicate on decisions made in active operations. However the question as to whether 
decisions on equipment procurement made long before any battle could fall within the 
scope of combat immunity is one to be determined on the facts at trial, and therefore the 
MoD’s appeal to strike out the equipment claims was dismissed.177 The facts of each 
case were determined by the Supreme Court in their judgment on the 19th June 2013, in 
which the majority held: 
The question which these claims raise is whether the doctrine of combat immunity 
should be extended from actual or imminent armed conflict to failures at that earlier 
stage. I would answer it by saying that the doctrine should be narrowly construed. To 
apply the doctrine of combat immunity to these claims would involve an extension of 
that doctrine beyond the cases to which it has previously been applied. That in itself 
suggests that it should not be permitted….178 
 
Although the Supreme Court’s decision is a landmark ruling in that the government and 
the MoD have a legal duty of care to protect service personnel in combat, it only allows 
for cases to be pursued in the courts and does not mean that damages will definitely be 
awarded.179  
The closest analogy to the armed forces when considering the employer/employee 
relationship are cases relating to duties of care owed by employers to their staff in 
relation the emergency services. The Court of Appeal in King v Sussex Ambulance 
Service NHS Trust180 held that: 
An ambulance service owes the same duty of care towards its employees as does any 
other employer. There is no special rule in English law qualifying the obligations of 
others towards fire fighters, or presumably police officers, ambulance technicians 
and others whose occupations in the public service are inherently dangerous.181  
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It further stated that: 
 
Such public servants accept the risks which are inherent in their work, but not the 
risks which the exercise of reasonable care on the part of those who owe them a duty 
of care could avoid. An employer owes his employees a duty to take reasonable care 
to provide safe equipment and a safe system of work, which includes assessing the 
tasks to be undertaken, training in how to perform those tasks as safely as possible, 
and supervision in performing them.182 
 
Therefore taking the Court of Appeals judgment in the King case and applying it to 
current armed forces equipment cases, could it not be argued that although service 
personnel are aware of the risks they face in combat, there should still be a duty of care 
on the MoD to ensure that such risks are avoided as far as reasonably possible by 
providing suitable equipment? 
 
As the MoD have argued, issues of procurement may give rise to complex questions 
of political nature or to decisions in which caution must be accorded when addressing 
the fair, just and reasonable test of Caparo. Yet this should not afford to it a blanket 
exclusion of liability. This point was addressed by Lord Nicholls in Stovin v Wise and 
Norfolk County Council183 in which he stated: 
He (the individual) must act as would a reasonable person in his position. The 
standard of reasonableness is to be measured by what may reasonably be expected of 
the defendant in his individual circumstances. Where action calls for expenditure, the 
court if necessary will have regard to the financial resources of the defendant.184  
 
The allocation of resources argument is often deployed by the MoD to deny any 
existence of a duty of care in relation to the procurement of equipment, whether or not 
the decisions on such equipment are made long before the heat of any battle. But the 
mere fact that policy questions may arise as to the allocation of resources should not in 
itself preclude the existence of a legal duty of care. In support of this, Moses LJ relied 
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upon the House of Lords decision in Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council185 
which accepted that the existence of a duty of care owed by a local authority to a child 
in care was unclear, even though the case raised policy questions as to the defensive 
conduct by care authorities. 
The fact that equipment claims may give rise to policy issues of procurement is not 
persuasive enough to result in the claimant failing the third limb of the Caparo test. The 
MoD do not put forward any empirical evidence to suggest that imposing a duty of care 
upon them in relation to procurement issues would place an unreasonable burden on 
resources. 
In addition to the argument that the imposition of a duty of care would raise 
procurement issues, it is also submitted by the MoD that in negligence liability claims 
the imposition of a duty of care is not in the wider interests of the community since it 
would mean that the armed forces would go into action subject to the law of civil 
negligence. In the Hill case Lord Keith raised this public policy issue stating that it 
would result in operations being conducted in a detrimentally defensive frame of 
mind.186 This would be afforded some truth if the courts were saying that individual 
soldiers could be found liable if the decisions they made in the heat of battle resulted in 
the harm of another soldier. However this is not the case as was established in chapter 
three in the judgment of Neill LJ in the Mulcahy case.  
Combat immunity was adopted as a way of dismissing this negligence liability for 
deaths and injuries arising out of conflict as it would be unreasonable to impose a duty 
of care on members of the armed forces when they have to make quick decisions in the 
heat of battle.  
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Even if it is unreasonable to impose a duty of care in battle situations does this mean 
that it is also unreasonable to impose a duty of care in relation to the procurement of 
equipment long before any battle?  
As a result of the judgments handed down in Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence,187 
Multiple Claimants v Ministry of Defence188 and Bici v Ministry of Defence189 the scope 
of combat immunity emphasis is on ‘actual engagement’ and the ‘heat of battle’. The 
procurement of equipment on the other hand is related to acts or omissions which may 
occur many years before any active operations and therefore it seems arguable that 
equipment claims fall outside of the scope of combat immunity. Combat immunity 
should be narrowly construed as expressed by Elias J in the Bici case, that to apply the 
immunity to equipment procurement would involve an extension of the doctrine beyond 
cases to which it had previously been applied. If such claims are to fall within the scope 
of combat immunity it would seem that this would be because equipment decisions 
relate to future active operations, but if combat immunity is to extend so far, it is 
difficult to see how anything done by the MoD will fall beyond it.  
While the MoD will continue to adopt combat immunity to repudiate a negligence claim 
arising out of combat because of issues arising from policy, decisions that are made in 
the UK before any combat should not attach to them any immunity.  
The question of liability for public authorities and the MoD for the decisions which 
they make on procurement has its foundations in the principles of Crown immunity. 
Decisions on public authority and MoD liability often involve arguments as to the 
operational and policy issues.  
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A distinction is often made between activities involving matters of ‘policy’ and 
activities which are regarded as ‘operational’ and are in many cases a persistent feature 
of reasoning in public policy cases. This was explored in Anns v Merton LBC.190 In 
Anns the way in which buildings were inspected was seen to be an ‘operational’ activity 
to which negligence liability may attach itself, but the decision to allocate financial 
resources would be immune from suit as such policy decisions are not justiciable.191 
The problem with this distinction, however, is that it is difficult to identify operational 
matters that do not involve any element of policy.192 An example of a non-justiciable 
claim would be where a duty of care is said to be owed by a branch of the Government 
or police, in making a policy decision regarding the allocation of resources. It was 
suggested by Cory J in Just v British Columbia193 that; ‘policy decisions should be 
exempt from tortious claims so that Governments are not restricted in making decisions 
based upon social, political or economic factors’.194 Decisions made on the policy issue 
focus on the scrutinising of a decision which has already been made and not decisions 
which may be made in the future. The courts therefore persistently disallow public 
negligence liability to arise in such circumstances. Decisions on liability with regard to 
the operational and policy issues for public authorities such as the fire brigade differ 
from those made for MoD liability. When firemen go to fight fires they are on the 
operational plane and can be held liable for any negligent decisions made whereas if 
questions of policy arise it will be difficult to establish liability. This point was 
established by Lord Wilberforce in the Anns case in which he stated that there is a 
                                                                 
190 [1978] A.C. 728 HL 
191 P Gil iker and S Beckwith, Tort (4th edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 2011) p.46 
192 Ibid  
193 [1989] 2 SCR 1228 
194 Ibid [1240] 
56 
 
distinction between operational and policy areas and that it was only the latter which 
should provide immunity for public authorities.195  
In contrast, through the judgments of cases which have come before the courts in 
relation to deaths and injuries of service personnel on the battlefield, it was held in the 
Mulcahy case that a duty of care would not be owed for negligent actions which arise as 
a result of combat. However, decisions made with regard to resources and equipment 
have been brought before the courts in cases such as Albutt and others v Ministry of 
Defence196 discussed earlier in this chapter, to argue that liability should attach itself 
where a member of the armed forces has been killed or seriously injured as a result of 
negligent decisions that have been made long before any conflict. In the Albutt case Mr 
Justice Owen rejected the MoD’s claim that it did not owe a duty of care towards 
soldiers, in relation to equipment, due to combat immunity. In considering whether to 
impose liability for negligence would be fair, just and reasonable would depend on the 
nature of each case, the equipment and its availability and a risk/benefit analysis.197 The 
MoD has not provided any compelling arguments for a negligence claim to be struck 
out in relation to the procurement of equipment. 
4.3. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to demonstrate the inadequate response of English law in the 
difficult area of cases arising from negligence against public bodies and the MoD. The 
MoD has argued that they do not owe a duty of care in combat for equipment failings 
due to public policy arguments. However it seems that such arguments are not 
persuasive. Matters of policy bear up for errors in battle but not for equipment decisions 
made long before any battle which have time for considered thought and exercise of 
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judgment. While negligence liability should not attach itself to soldiers making 
decisions in the heat of battle, there should at least be a duty of care owed in relation to 
equipment decisions made months or even years before any conflict operations. 
Liability placed upon the MoD for supplying inadequate equipment which has led to 
deaths and injuries of service personnel in combat would mean more efficiency in the 
procurement of equipment and would not lead to a defensive approach as suggested. 
Ignoring combat immunity for now, if a hypothetical injured soldier was able to 
proceed with a tort claim, what would be the courts findings in terms of tortious hurdles 
of the standard of care, proximity and causation? These issues are not normally 
considered as combat immunity inhibits common law considerations. This thesis will 
now turn to examine the three issues starting with the standard of care. 
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Chapter Five 
Standard of Care 
 
The standard of care which a defendant will owe is one that is set by law, but the 
question as to whether the defendant fell below that standard of care is set by the facts 
of each case. Once it has been established that the defendant owes a duty of care, it must 
then be established whether that duty of care has been breached. This chapter will deal 
with the general principles the courts employ when setting a standard of care and 
whether these principles show the MoD being in breach of its duty of care to service 
personnel. By examining the standard of care would this mean that as a result of the 
public policy issues examined in the previous chapter, a lower or no standard of care 
will be placed upon public bodies such as the MoD? With this in mind will the MoD 
meet the necessary standard of care so as not to be held negligently liable for the deaths 
or serious injuries of service personnel in combat? 
In order to approach this, the degree of proportion between the costs of preventative 
measures that would need to be taken if a duty of care were recognised must be weighed 
against the prospect of harm.198 
5.1. General principles for establishing a standard of care 
 
The standard of care requirement operates as an additional limiting factor to the finding 
of liability for a negligence claim. Liability can arise in negligence only if a public 
body’s acts or omissions fall below or breach the required standard of care that would 
normally be exercised by that of ‘the reasonable person.’ This was confirmed by 
Alderson B in Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Co199 who said: 
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Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon 
those considerations which already regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, 
or doing something which a reasonable and prudent man would not do.200 
 
If the standard of care is not fulfilled to the reasonable and prudent man standard then 
the defendant would have been adjudged to have acted negligently.201 Primarily the 
standard of care will determine performance standards expected of a public body in 
order for them to avoid liability.202  Unfortunately the aspect of standard of care has 
received little attention from the courts in respect of the MoD in the context of 
operational activities, presumably because of the focus on policy issues and combat 
immunity that prevent cases involving operational activities getting as far in the courts 
so as to discuss the standard of care issue. The continued existence of combat immunity 
is evidence that there is a certain category of cases such as those discussed in chapter 3 
involving operational activities, in which the courts will say that there is no duty of care 
owed by the MoD to soldiers in such circumstances, rather than to say that there is a 
duty but the standard of care is so low in combat that the MoD have not breached it. It 
would seem that by drawing analogy with established approaches in previous cases 
involving the exercise of professional competences, a claim will only proceed where the 
MoD performance has fallen below the standard of care reasonably expected. 
On the matters relevant to prove a defendant’s breach of a standard of care two main 
factors must be established; whether there was foreseeability of harm; and secondly 
assessing the magnitude of risk. 
If the harm suffered by the claimant was not foreseeable then the defendant will not 
be deemed to be negligent. This is because the reasonable person cannot be expected to 
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take precautions against unforeseeable risks.203 For example, in Roe v Minister of 
Health204 the defendant was not held liable for the paralysis of the claimant after a 
spinal anaesthetic was contaminated with phenol. The reason for this was that it was not 
known at the time that contamination could occur through invisible cracks in the glass 
when the anaesthetic was stored in phenol. Therefore without prior knowledge of this 
the defendant could not have taken any precautions against the risk of contamination. 
To take the foreseeability factor and compare it to situations in which service 
personnel have died or been seriously injured in combat as a result of allegedly 
inadequate equipment, could it not be argued that the MoD have knowledge that service 
personnel run a high risk of being shot at, or being exposed to IED’s and therefore can 
reasonably foresee that to deploy service personnel on operations with inadequate 
equipment might result in a high risk of death or serious injury? 
There is no doubt that the MoD owes members of the armed forces a duty of care at 
common law to provide a safe system of work and safe equipment under the Health and 
Safety at Work Act 1974. However no such duty arises in battlefield situations.205 The 
MoD has argued that in extreme battlefield conditions they cannot be expected to 
maintain a level of care similar to that of a regular employer, but what amounts to 
reasonable care in the circumstances? As Lord Hoffman stated in Tomlinson v 
Congleton BC:206  
The question of what amounts to reasonable care depends upon assessing not only 
the likelihood of injury and the seriousness of the potential injury, but also the social 
value of the activity which gives rise to the risk and cost of preventative measures. 
These factors have to be balanced against each other.’207   
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The main context relating to the standard of care which the MoD should owe to service 
personnel relates to equipment decisions made long before any combat and within the 
baseline of Great Britain. It is reasonably foreseeable that a member of the armed forces 
will be at a high risk of death or serious injury during combat operations abroad and 
therefore the MoD must provide adequate equipment that will protect soldiers against 
such risks. The MoD should take reasonable steps by analogy to the reasonable person 
test, by providing sufficient body armour and vehicles to minimise the risk of injury or 
death to service personnel.  This was established by Aikens LJ in Whippy v Jones208 
who stated; ‘The court must be satisfied that a reasonable person in the position of the 
defendant would contemplate that injury is likely to follow from his acts or 
omissions.’209 
One of the most prominent cases concerning a breach of a statutory duty was that of 
the Nimrod aircraft explosion which killed all 16 service personnel on board. The 
families of those 16 service personnel killed sought to sue the MoD for failing to 
minimise risk. The MoD owed a duty of care to the 16 deceased to ensure that the 
aircraft was safe to fly, and failed in that duty of care by carrying out an inferior safety 
review of the aircraft.210 In a landmark legal admission the MoD admitted that they had 
breached a duty of care when they failed to ensure the safety of 16 service personnel 
who were killed when their Nimrod aircraft exploded during air-to-air refuelling.211 
This out of court admission by the MoD has been the only case in which they have 
taken full responsibility and adequately compensated the victim families without their 
having to go through the Armed Forces Compensation Scheme (AFCS) or the courts. 
                                                                 
208 [2009] EWCA Civ 452 
209 Ibid 
210 C Hadden-Cave, ‘The Nimrod Review: an independent review into the broader issues surrounding  
the loss of the RAF Nimrod MR2 Aircraft XV230 in Afghanistan 2006’ (28 October, 2006) 
211 J Doward and M Townsend, ‘MoD takes blame for 14 military deaths in Nimrod blast’ Guardian (29 
March 2009) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/mar/29/nimrod-legal-admission> accessed 1st April  2013 
62 
 
Taking the second factor, of assessing the magnitude of risk, into account involves 
the consideration of two elements; firstly if there is a likelihood that harm will occur; 
and secondly the seriousness of the consequences if harm did occur.212 The case of 
Walker v Northumberland County Council213 relates to the first element on whether 
there is a likelihood of harm. The claimant in the case suffered a nervous breakdown 
due to considerable stress and pressure from work. After returning to work on the 
agreement that he would be assisted with the workload, which was withdrawn within a 
month, the claimant suffered a second mental breakdown and was diagnosed with stress 
related anxiety.214 The court found that it was reasonably foreseeable that the claimant 
would suffer a mental breakdown as a consequence of not being able to cope with his 
work, and that there was a risk of repetition if he was exposed to the same workload.215 
Thus there was a likelihood that harm would occur as a result of the stress of the 
workload. 
Taking the armed forces into account when assessing the likelihood of harm it could 
be argued that the risk of harm occurring is high given the exposure to violence on the 
battlefield.  
 In Multiple Claimants v Ministry of Defence,216 combat immunity proved to be a 
barrier to establishing whether the standard of care exercisable by the MoD would 
require the detection and treatment of PTSD. There is clear evidence that symptoms 
similar or equal to those established with PTSD have occurred in a number of service 
personnel in nearly every major conflict since WWI.217 It is legitimate to argue in 
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principle that the MoD knew that there is significant risk of personnel contracting PTSD 
and that the MoD should embed processes that detect and treat it. 
The second element of the magnitude of risk involves the seriousness of the 
consequences that arise from not taking appropriate steps to ensure an adequate standard 
of care. To look towards the armed forces it is clear that the consequences of not 
providing an appropriate standard of care would result in death or serious injury to 
service personnel or to on-going mental health issues. Nevertheless the doctrine of 
combat immunity remains a firm barrier to negligence claims against the MoD; the 
result is that the MoD has thus avoided meaningful common law review of the standard 
of care it should employ in regard to service personnel employed in varied and diverse 
conflict theatres.   
 While assessing the magnitude of risk and foreseeability of harm occurring the 
courts also take into account the social utility of the act in order to determine whether 
the cost of reducing or eliminating the risk outweigh the benefits of not doing so. The 
courts will deem some risks worth taking if the defendant’s purpose has social utility, 
which is particularly relevant in times of war and emergency.218 
5.2. The Burden of taking precautions 
The cost of taking precautions balanced against the probability of risk of harm will be 
taken into account by the courts when assessing whether a defendant has been negligent. 
If the burden of steps taken to eliminate the risk is far greater than the benefit of 
eliminating it, then a failure to take those steps will not amount to negligent liability.219 
In Latimer v AEC Ltd220 the defendant’s factory was flooded leaving a slippery residue 
on the floor. The defendants put sawdust on most of the floor but could not cover the 
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whole floor as they did not have enough. The claimant consequently slipped on the part 
of the floor where there was no sawdust and it was argued by the claimant that the 
factory should have been closed to prevent injury. It his judgment Denning LJ held that: 
The employers knew the floor was slippery and that there was some risk in letting the 
men work on it; but still they could not be reasonably expected to shut down the 
whole works and send all the men home … it is quite clear the defendant did 
everything they could have reasonably expected to do … therefore there was no 
negligence at common law.221 
 
However there was only a minimal risk that an employee would slip and injure them 
whereas the risk of death or injury in the armed forces is extremely high. The MoD set 
their level of required safety risks for both peacetime and wartime on ALARP, which 
means that risks should be reduced to a level that is ‘As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable’.222 A risk is deemed to be ALARP when: 
It has been demonstrated that the cost of any further risk reduction, where the cost 
includes the loss of defence capability as well as financial or other resource costs, is 
grossly disproportionate to the benefit obtained from that risk reduction.223 
 
It could be argued that the cost of supplying more body armour or better armoured 
vehicles would not outweigh the benefit of reducing the risk of death or serious injury 
for service personnel. The more deaths and injuries that occur from combat, however, 
the more compensation claims will be made. Thus it would benefit the MoD to provide 
sufficient equipment to reduce the risk of death or serious injury. This was referred to in 
the case of Edwards v National Coal Board224in which the Court of Appeal held in 
respect of a duty of care at common law that: 
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… In every case it is the risk that has to be weighed against the measures necessary 
to eliminate the risk. The greater the risk, no doubt, the less will be the weight given 
to the factor of the cost.225 
 
If the MoD believes that deploying equipment such as the Snatch Land Rover is a 
smaller risk than not supplying them at all, then they would have complied with the 
level of safety risk by the ALARP principle.  However in the more recent case of Albutt 
and Others v Ministry of Defence226 the MoD had failed in fitting the Challenger tanks 
with technology which would protect them adequately against the risk of friendly fire. 
The risk of death and serious injury in the Albutt case was far greater than the cost of 
fitting the technology which would have protected them. The impact of equipment 
shortages and inadequate equipment has increased combat operations litigation against 
the MoD which in turn has led to more compensation payments under the Armed Forces 
Compensation Scheme.  The cost of buying adequate equipment surely outweighs the 
cost of defending litigation claims as with proper equipment service personnel will be at 
a reduced risk of death or serious injury and therefore this would result in a decrease in 
litigation claims. 
Other factors such as decisions made in an emergency or in the ‘heat of the moment’ 
can determine the standard of care. Where decisions are made in the ‘heat of the 
moment’ the standard of care is often relaxed as decisions often have to be made 
without considered thought. This was emphasised in Hughes v National Union of 
Mineworkers227 where it was held that in high-pressure circumstances, which involve 
physical danger where instant decisions have to be made, it would be unreasonable to 
ascribe tortious liability. However decisions over the procurement of military equipment 
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are not made in the ‘heat of the moment’ and therefore the courts should ascribe liability 
to them. 
5.3. Conclusion 
The standard of care requirement is not widely spoken of in cases involving deaths and 
serious injuries in the course of combat; this is because the MoD relies upon combat 
immunity to negate a duty of care even existing in such situations. As a result, analogy 
was instead drawn from established approaches to determine what standard of care the 
MoD should have towards service personnel. 
Applying cases such as Edwards to active service leads to the conclusion that it is 
likely that the MoD would not meet the necessary requirements of the standard of care. 
Providing inadequate equipment when the risk of death or injury to service personnel is 
high falls below the necessary standard of care. Therefore if the courts were to take this 
into account when establishing liability they would find the MoD in breach of their duty 
of care. 
If the MoD are deemed to have fallen below the necessary standard of care the 
question then turns to whether the deaths or injuries of service personnel were a direct 
result of inadequate equipment or whether the equipment was just a contribution. The 
thesis will now turn to the next issue of causation. 
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Chapter six 
Causation in negligence 
 
In order to prove that a defendant is liable for damages in negligence, causation has to 
be established. Two conditions must be satisfied in order for causation to be established, 
firstly, that the defendant exercised less than due care, and secondly that the defendant’s 
negligence caused the injury. In applying the normal common law principles, would the 
courts find that the inadequate supply of equipment contributed to or was the main 
cause of injury and death to the hypothetical soldier?  
In order to assess whether equipment is a causal link to service personnel deaths and 
injuries each case will need to be assessed on their own circumstances. If it can be 
shown that the deaths or injuries would not have occurred if service personnel had been 
provided with better armoured vehicles or more body armour then a causal link to the 
deaths and injuries of service personnel could be found. 
6.1. Causation 
 
Causation focuses on the cause and effect of an action, where every effect is produced 
by the coming together of one or many causes of action. In order to establish the chain 
of causation the law takes a pragmatic approach. As Lord Wright said in Yorkshire Dale 
Steamship Co Ltd v Minister of War Transport;228 ‘causation is to be understood as the 
man in the street, and not as either the scientist or the metaphysician, would understand 
it.’229 However, the court’s legal language can produce confusion as to what extent the 
defendant will be liable in causation. 
Two things need to be considered when assessing whether the defendant’s action was 
a legal cause of the claimant’s loss; firstly was what the defendant did a factual cause of 
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loss; secondly was the type of harm caused to the claimant reasonably foreseeable. 
Negligence law distinguished between the two and will be discussed below.  
The starting point for determining causation is the ‘but for test’ which asks the 
question ‘can it be said that but for the defendant’s conduct, the claimant’s loss would 
not have occurred?’ In other words would the claimant have suffered a loss in any event 
without the defendant’s conduct?230 An illustration of the application of the ‘but for’ 
test is the case of Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management 
Committee231 where the claimant went to a casualty department feeling unwell after 
having drunk some tea. The doctor in charge sent him away without treatment and 
subsequently the claimant died of arsenic poisoning. It was held that even though the 
doctor was in breach of his duty of care for not examining the claimant, he had not 
caused the claimant’s death as having drunk the arsenic the claimant was beyond help 
when he arrived.232 
In applying the ‘but for’ test the claimant must prove on the balance of probabilities 
that the defendant’s breach caused or materially contributed to the harm. In Bonnington 
Castings v Wardlaw233 the claimant sought damages after contracting pneumoconiosis 
as a result of accumulation of silica particles in his lungs while working for the 
defendant. There were two possible sources from which the claimant could have 
accumulated the particles; pneumatic hammer and swing grinders. As the two sources 
had both led to the contraction of the disease, Lord Reid in the House of Lords held 
that: 
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‘It appears to me that the source of his disease was the dust from both sources, and 
the real question is whether the dust from the swing grinders materially contributed 
to the disease. What is a material contribution must be a question of degree.’234 
 
In his judgment Lord Reid found that the swing grinders did materially contribute to the 
disease as the ventilation was not adequate enough to carry away the dust to prevent it 
from being inhaled by the claimant and therefore the dust from the grinders had 
contributed to the disease. 
To take the ‘but for’ test and apply it to a situation such as those involving the Snatch 
Land Rover the question to be asked would be, ‘but for’ the MoD’s conduct in 
supplying a vehicle that was not suitable for the conditions in Iraq, would the claimants 
injury have occurred? The family of Private Lee Ellis, who was killed when his Snatch 
Land Rover struck a roadside bomb, argued that he would not have died if the MoD had 
procured mine-protected vehicles.235 However on the 1st May 2013 three soldiers were 
killed and a further six were injured as a result of a roadside bomb while they were 
travelling in a Mastiff armoured patrol vehicle.  Before this incident service personnel 
and their dependants argued that the inadequacy of the Snatch Land Rover as a patrol 
vehicle was the cause of service personnel deaths and if they had been given better 
armoured vehicles the deaths of those servicemen would not have occurred. However, 
this most recent incident throws an interesting perspective on equipment claims and the 
issues of causation as the Mastiff has been described by the Prime Minister, David 
Cameron, as being ‘the best known protection against bombs.’236 If this is the case it 
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would seem that the Snatch Land Rover was not the cause of the deaths of the service 
personnel but only a contributing factor.  On the other hand where the lack of body 
armour has led to the death of a member of the armed forces causation should be 
considered more carefully. The board of inquiry in the case of Sergeant Steven Roberts, 
who died from a gunshot wound as he was told to give up his body armour to a fellow 
soldier, found that the bullet proof plates that were on the body armour would have 
saved his life had he been wearing it.237 Each case must be established on its own merits 
and the fact that service personnel are injured or killed in combat should not mean that 
enemy fire or roadside bombs automatically rule out the liability of the MoD in the 
procurement of defective equipment.   
On the other hand, even if it is found that the MoD has caused injury or death it does 
not automatically mean that they are liable either. This was highlighted in the case of 
McGhee v National Coal Board238 where the claimant contracted dermatitis as a result 
of his job and argued that because the defendant had not provided washing facilities it 
had increased his risk of contracting the disease. The defendant had admitted that he had 
breached his duty of care towards the claimant by not providing washing facilities, but 
contended that the claimant had not proved on the balance of probabilities that he would 
not have contracted the disease even if washing facilities were available. In the House 
of Lords judgment Lord Simon of Glaisdale stated that; ‘failure to take steps which 
would bring about a material reduction of the risk involves a substantial contribution to 
the injury.’239 In other words the fact that the defendant had not provided washing 
facilities that would have reduced the risk of contracting dermatitis meant that the 
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defendant had made a contribution to the contraction of the disease. Yet Lord Reid in 
his judgment found in favour of the claimant stating: 
From a broad point and practical viewpoint I can see no substantial difference 
between saying that what the defender did materially increased the risk of injury to 
the pursuer and saying that what the defender did made a material contribution to his 
injury.240 
The fact that the claimant had to cycle home ‘caked with grime and sweat’ added 
materially to the risk that the disease might develop.241Therefore the claimant could 
recover damages in respect of the defendant’s inability to provide washing facilities and 
in light of the defendant’s admittance of this failure.242  
Taking account of the causal issues discussed above it would be difficult for a 
member of the armed forces to establish in some cases that the injury occurred was a 
direct cause of inadequate equipment.  However in the case of Sergeant Roberts who 
was shot and killed after he was told to give up his body armour to another member of 
the armed forces, a MoD enquiry into his death confirmed he would have survived if he 
was wearing the body armour.243   
6.2. Conclusion 
In applying common law principles and related case law on causation it would be upon 
the individual court to find whether the inadequate supply of equipment contributed to 
or was responsible for causing injury or death to a member of the armed forces. 
Nevertheless, if a hypothetical soldier is not given body armour to wear on the 
battlefield and is shot dead then the issue of causation is simple to establish. If the 
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soldier had been wearing the body armour he would not have died from his injury, the 
lack of body armour would be the direct cause of his death and not a contributory factor.  
Under current civil law bringing a negligence claim against the MoD is challenging 
and there are many legal hurdles including that a member of the armed forces must 
prove that the injuries were a significant contributing factor of inadequate equipment. In 
the absence of civil law the thesis will turn to the question of whether service personnel 
are able to rely upon their human rights set out within the Human Rights Act 1998.  
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Chapter 7 
Human Rights on the Battlefield 
 
There seems to be no legal duty placed upon the MoD to protect soldiers on the 
battlefield by providing them with adequate equipment as the defence of combat 
immunity means that where a death or injury has resulted from armed conflict, then the 
MoD will not be legally liable and therefore service personnel cannot claim damages 
against them. It is arguable, however, that this position is incompatible with both Article 
6 and Article 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
This chapter will consider to what extent the MoD has a legal duty under the HRA 
1998 to provide adequate equipment and ensure the safety of service personnel on 
military operations. Furthermore, it will examine whether a legal remedy under the 
Human Rights Act is applicable to service personnel and if so whether service personnel 
are able in practice to rely upon their rights set out in the Convention in the event of 
death or serious injury in combat operations. 
7.1. Human Rights 
Cases that have failed under common law and have been brought under the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (HRA) have highlighted the significance and controversial role of the 
third limb of Caparo in establishing a duty of care. The Mulcahy case discussed in 
chapter three showed that as a result of public policy considerations, the MoD are not 
liable in tort for deaths or injuries that arise out of combat. Furthermore the police under 
the same public policy considerations are not liable for failing to take action in the 
investigation or suppression of crime.244 
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 Human rights law however has added an additional layer of control over public 
authorities and brought about a more intense scrutiny of public authorities 
functioning.245  This is because human rights law goes well beyond the prohibiting of 
infliction of harm as the Convention rights impose extensive duties on states to take 
positive measures to ensure the rights of individuals.  These extensive duties should also 
be extended to protect members of the armed forces on combat operations.  Human 
rights legislation was established to give protection only to the most vulnerable and 
disadvantaged. To British armed forces personnel ‘it imposes an obligation to establish 
an appropriate framework of legal protection to protect life to the greatest extent 
reasonably practicable.’246 Essentially, this means that the rights and lives of service 
personnel will be protected as long as it is practical to do so in the circumstances. 
Would this legal protection place an obligation on the MoD to ensure that all equipment 
that it deployed on operations is suitable for the conditions and is adequate so as not to 
risk the lives of service personnel further? The answer to this will be discussed later in 
this chapter when article 2 of the Convention is considered. 
Firstly, before considering the scope of article 2 it is necessary to establish cases that 
have raised questions under Article 6 of the ECHR in relation to the discussion of 
immunity from suit in negligence. Article 6 (1) provides that; ‘… everyone is entitled to 
a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law.’247 The thrust of the article 6 argument is that the 
conferment of immunity from negligence liability amounts to a restriction upon the 
right to access to a tribunal. 
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There is a difference between the HRA and the tort of negligence reflected in the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) jurisprudence about liability for the breach 
of a state’s positive human rights obligations.248 The restriction imposed by Article 6 
was demonstrated by the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the ECHR in Osman.249  
The Osman case concerned the extent to which Article 6 (1) of the Convention has been 
regarded as being inconsistent with the UK courts’ practice of striking out negligence 
claims. 
In Osman v Ferguson250 Mr Osman was killed and his son wounded in a shooting 
incident. Mr Osman’s son and widow alleged that the police had been negligent in 
failing to apprehend the attacker, as he was already known to be a danger to the family. 
The claim was struck out by the Court of Appeal on the application of the Hill principle 
of immunity251 in which McCowan LJ stated that; ‘in the light of the Hill v Chief 
Constable of West Yorkshire, their case was doomed to fail.’ This was because the 
police enjoyed immunity from negligence claims in respect of the investigation and 
suppression of crime.252 As a result of the striking out of the claim, the claimants 
applied to the ECHR arguing that the police immunity from liability for a negligent 
failure to prevent crime breached the claimants’ right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the 
Convention.253  The UK however argued that Article 6 was not applicable as the third 
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test of Caparo of ‘fair just and reasonableness’ did not exist in respect of the 
suppression and investigation of crime.254 
In Osman v United Kingdom255  the ECHR upheld the claim and found that there had 
been a violation of Article 6 as the Hill immunity acted as a bar to civil action by 
preventing them from having adjudication by a court on the merits of their case.  There 
should have been proper considerations given to the arguments of liability and balanced 
against the arguments for immunity. The Commission noted that the; ‘claimant’s claim 
satisfied the proximity component of a duty of care, which had not been satisfied by the 
claimant in the Hill case’256 and therefore the claimant’s case did not fall short of the 
exclusionary rule formulated by the House of Lords in Hill.257 Consideration of public 
policy issues should be examined on the merits and not automatically excluded as a 
result of immunity. The Government further argued that the case against the police 
should not be heard in the courts as this was not the only means of the claimant securing 
compensation. They stated that the claimant could bring an action in the court against 
Paget-Lewis, the man who had killed Mr Osman, or against Dr Ferguson, Paget-Lewis’ 
psychiatrist. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) was not persuaded by this 
argument in stating that: 
Neither an action against Paget-Lewis nor Dr Ferguson would have enabled the 
claimants to secure answers to the basic question which underpinned their civil 
action, namely why did the police not take action sooner to prevent Paget-Lewis 
from exacting a deadly retribution.258 
 
The ECHR thus found in favour of the claimants and awarded compensation for loss of 
opportunity to have their case heard in the courts. 
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 Immunities available against civil law claims of negligence have been an issue in 
many cases of negligence against the MoD. The MoD has sought to have struck out 
many negligence claims arising out of combat by arguing that combat immunity 
prevents negligence claims from being made and therefore they should be struck out.259 
 In the case of Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence,260 discussed in chapter three, the MoD 
sought to have struck out the claim on the basis that the injuries were sustained under 
combat conditions and therefore under the principles of combat immunity no cause of 
action should be allowed.  The more recent cases of Smith and others v Ministry of 
Defence261 which involved separate claims made against the MoD for deaths arising 
from the Snatch Land Rovers and Challenger tanks, also highlighted the attempt of the 
MoD to have struck out their claim as a result of the deaths arising out of combat and 
therefore being covered by combat immunity. The starting point for Moses LJ, in the 
Smith case, was the MoD’s duty as employer to provide a safe system of work for the 
claimant soldiers. The question was whether the duty yielded to the combat immunity 
principle relied upon in the Mulcahy case. It was held by the Court of Appeal that this 
question would have to be determined at trial. In his judgment Moses LJ gave guidance 
on the correct approach of combat immunity, stating; ‘It is not sufficient that the injuries 
sustained were in battle. The question was whether the supposedly negligent decisions 
were taken while in active operations.’262 This is taken to mean that training and 
equipment decisions taken some time before conflict could not enjoy combat immunity, 
but would fall outside of the immunity. If all MoD decisions regarding combat 
operations were to benefit from the blanket protection of combat immunity then this 
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would surely be a violation of a soldier’s right to a fair trial, as each case would be 
struck out before the facts could be examined by the courts.263 Although attempts were 
made by the MoD to get negligence claims struck out on the basis of combat immunity, 
the courts held in favour of the claimants and allowed the Challenger tank case to go 
before the courts to be judged on the individual circumstances.  
In addition to article 6 arguments there appear to be possible violations of article 2 of 
the ECHR as it is arguable that combat immunity is not compatible with article 2 of the 
HRA 1998. Article 2 provides that: 
‘Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his 
life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his 
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.’264  
 
Where article 2 applies, a claimant may claim on the basis that a public body did not do 
all that could be reasonably expected of them to avoid a real and immediate risk to life 
of which they had or ought to have had knowledge.265 This was emphasised in the case 
of R (on the application of Smith) v Oxfordshire Assistant Deputy Coroner266 which 
concerned a British soldier who had complained that he could not cope with the heat 
and subsequently died as a result of heatstroke on a UK military base in Iraq. An inquest 
found that Private Smith’s death was a result of a failure to address the difficulty he had 
in adjusting to the climate. In his judgment Collins J identified that the circumstances of 
Private Smith’s death gave rise to the issue of law whether there was a failure by the 
Army to provide an adequate system to protect his life.267 Where there is a known risk 
to life the MoD should take appropriate steps to avoid or minimise such a risk and it is 
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clear in this case that the MoD ignored Private Smith’s difficulty in adjusting to the 
climate. The Court of Appeal concluded that: 
On the basis of Strasbourg jurisprudence there is no doubt that it would apply to 
Private Smith if he were a conscript. It would therefore not be right to draw a 
distinction between a regular soldier and a conscript.268 
 
On this conclusion would a member of the armed forces be able to rely upon article 2 
when on combat operations abroad? The Court of Appeal held that service personnel are 
‘under the control of and are subject to Army discipline. They must do what the Army 
requires them to do. In that respect they are in the same position as a conscript.’269 
Therefore soldiers should be allowed to rely upon their rights under the Convention as 
could a conscript. This was an important landmark ruling in the application of human 
rights to service personnel on combat operations outside of the UK. The ruling meant 
that if a member of the armed forces was injured while within or outside a British Army 
base, then they could successfully seek to rely upon the rights set out in article 2. 
However, the MoD challenged this ruling and took the case further to the Supreme 
Court. 
The Supreme Court’s judgment determined that a British soldier cannot rely upon the 
Convention unless he is on the premises of a military base. The majority judges based 
their opinions on the fact that the death of a serviceman on active service did not 
automatically give rise to the obligation of article 2. Soldiers were at risk of death and 
serious injury as part of their job, therefore the death of a soldier in combat did not raise 
a case to say that the MoD had failed in their obligation to protect Private Smith, and 
that there had been a breach of article 2.270 
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In Smith and others v Ministry of Defence,271 which involved multiple cases against 
the MoD for service personnel deaths in Snatch Land Rovers and Challenger tanks, the 
question of whether article 2 could be relied upon by members of the armed forces, in 
relation to deaths or injuries arising from inadequate equipment, was considered. Moses 
LJ was of the view that the case of R (on application of Smith) v Oxfordshire Assistant 
Deputy Coroner272 was not binding and therefore ‘the conclusion must be that the 
armed forces operating outside their base are within the United Kingdom Convention 
jurisdiction,’273 and therefore presuming that the Smith274 case is inconsistent with the 
Al-Skeini ruling. 
The claimants’ pleaded case in Smith and others v Ministry of Defence was that 
article 2 imposed a positive obligation on the MoD to ‘take appropriate steps to protect 
life by providing suitable armoured equipment for use by soldiers on active service in 
Iraq.’275 The allegations of breach fell into two categories; firstly the failure to provide 
better/medium armoured vehicles, and secondly breaches that relate to operational 
decisions made by commanders including procurement issues.   
It was submitted by Mr Eadie on behalf of the MoD that article 2 of the Convention 
cannot and should not be interpreted so broadly as to give rise to the duties with which 
the claimants contend, further stating that previous case law has made it clear that an 
implied operational obligation has only been imposed upon a state in certain 
circumstances. Mr Eadie took as his starting point the decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights in Renolde v France276 in which they stated: 
Article 2 may apply in well-defined circumstances a positive obligation on the 
authorities to take preventative operational measure to protect an individual … 
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However, this obligation must be interpreted in such a way which does not impose an 
impossible or disproportionate burden on the operational choices which must be 
made in terms of priorities and resources.277 
 
Thus he was arguing that placing such an obligation upon the MoD to take operational 
measures to protect soldiers in times of combat would impose an unreasonable burden 
upon the MoD and may affect the choices they make in the procurement of equipment. 
In response to the MoD’s argument that an obligation cannot arise under Article 2, Mr 
Robert Weir QC, acting on behalf of the Snatch Land Rover claimants, demonstrated 
that the article 2 obligation may apply to soldiers on active service. Relying upon the 
speech of Baroness Hale in Savage v South Essex Partnership NHS,278 that the state is 
under an obligation to protect soldiers form harm; ‘the state must not only refrain from 
taking life but also take positive steps to protect the lives of those within its 
jurisdiction.’279 If there is an allegation that military authorities have failed to protect 
the right to life, ‘the court must examine whether the military authorities knew of or 
ought to have known of the real and immediate risk, and whether they had done 
everything that could be reasonably expected of them to do to prevent that risk.’280  A 
‘real and immediate risk’ is likely to be met in combat operations as service personnel 
are exposed to dangerous and volatile situations and therefore an article 2 obligation to 
take all reasonable and preventative measures to protect life should be placed upon the 
MoD in combat operations so as to ensure the best possible protection for service 
personnel. 
However, in his counter-argument Mr Edie on behalf of the MoD was of the opinion 
that questions regarding the military equipment provided by the state should fall outside 
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the scope of any article 2 investigation, relying upon Lord Rodger in Smith v 
Oxfordshire Assistant Deputy Coroner:281 
Of course it will often be possible to say that the death might well not have occurred 
if the soldier had been in a vehicle with thicker armour-plating … Even if this is 
correct, it does not point to any failure of the relevant authorities to do their best to 
protect soldiers’ lives.282 
 
Further, Lord Kerr observed that: 
Deaths and injuries of soldiers in a combat situation are inevitable. There is no 
reason to anticipate that a similar level of scrutiny to that suitable to the death of a 
civilian will be required or appropriate where a soldier has been killed in the course 
of military operations.283 
 
However, this should not mean that the MoD will be free from liability where a soldier 
has not been given protective body armour or where military vehicles have not been 
fitted with Target Identity Devices so that service personnel can distinguish between 
enemy vehicles and their own. It is true that deaths and injuries of soldiers on active 
service are inevitable but numerous deaths could have been avoided if the MoD had 
provided adequate equipment. It must not be overlooked that many cases occur where 
the deaths and serious injuries of soldiers indicate a systematic or operational failing on 
behalf of the MoD for failing to provide soldiers with equipment which is needed to 
protect lives.  
In considering the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v Oxfordshire Assistant Deputy 
Coroner,284 that a soldier was within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction while on a UK 
military base but not while on patrol outside of a UK military base, the Court of Appeal 
in Smith v Ministry of Defence285 considered the territorial and extra-territorial notion of 
jurisdiction. To extend Convention jurisdiction beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the 
High Contracting Parties is exceptional and requires special justification. The Grand 
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Chamber in Bankovic v Belgium286 essentially reaffirmed and refined the categories of 
exceptions for extra-territorial jurisdiction first set out in Loizidou v Turkey,287 stating 
that extra-territorial jurisdiction may apply ‘where acts of state authorities produced 
effects or were performed outside their own territory’288 or cases ‘where as a 
consequence of military action a contracting party exercised effective control of an area 
outside its national territory.’289 The majority in Smith v Oxfordshire found no sufficient 
reason for such an extension in relation to the UK armed forces operating outside of 
their base, basing their reasoning on their opinion that issues relating to armed 
hostilities were essentially non-justiciable.290 The Supreme Court in Smith v 
Oxfordshire found support in R (Al Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence291 in which 
the Court of Appeal stated: 
The Article 1 jurisdiction does not extend to a broad, worldwide extraterritorial 
personal jurisdiction arising from the exercise of authority by party states' agents 
anywhere in the world.292 
It further stated: 
To broaden the exception currently under discussion into one which extends 
extraterritorial jurisdiction to the situations concerned in the case of the first five 
claimants would be illegitimate in two respects: it would drive a coach and horses 
through the narrow exceptions illustrated by such limited examples, and it would 
sidestep the limitations we have found to exist under the broader doctrine of 
“effective control of an area.293 
However, the Court of Appeal’s decision in Al-Skeini was overturned by the Grand 
Chamber so as to allow the first 5 claimants to come within the jurisdiction of the UK 
outside of a military base through the state’s jurisdiction of ‘authority and control over 
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an individual.’294 The Grand Chamber came to this conclusion as the UK assumed in 
Iraq the exercise of some of the public powers normally to be exercised by a sovereign 
government following the removal of power from the Ba’ath regime.295 In these 
circumstances the court considers that the UK, through its soldiers engaged in security 
operations in Basra, exercised authority and control over individuals killed in the course 
of such operations, so as to establish a jurisdictional link between the deceased and the 
UK.296 
It could be argued that the Grand Chamber’s decision in Al-Skeini contradicts the 
Supreme Court judgment in Smith v Oxfordshire Assistant Deputy Coroner297that the 
state’s armed forces abroad are not within its jurisdiction outside of a military base and 
therefore the decision in Smith can no longer be maintained. If this position is adopted 
then it would mean that the Court of Appeal in Smith v Oxfordshire were correct in their 
judgment and subsequently service personnel are able to rely upon their rights under the 
Convention.  
The claimant in Smith and others contended that this reliance on the Grand 
Chamber’s decision in Al-Skeini offered an opportunity for the Court of Appeal in Smith 
v Others to disagree with Smith v Oxfordshire and grant service personnel a remedy 
under the HRA. However the Grand Chambers reference to authority and control is a 
reference to bringing individuals within the power and control of a state in 
circumstances similar to detention and imprisonment.298  Therefore although the armed 
forces are under the authority and control of the MoD, they are not in the sense 
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described by the Grand Chamber in Al-Skeini and so the Court of Appeal in Smith and 
Others ruled that article 2 could not apply to soldiers outside of a UK military base. 
It is difficult to see how the physicality of a military base makes any difference as to 
whether or not a soldier is subject to UK jurisdiction. If service personnel are not under 
the jurisdiction of the UK when outside of a military base then whose jurisdiction do 
they come under? This is a serious concern for service personnel as the current law is 
essentially declaring that off a UK military base soldiers are in a legal no-mans land.    
7.2. Conclusion 
Through analysis of the doctrinal test for establishing jurisdiction under the HRA 
previous cases that have come before the Supreme Court such as Smith v Oxfordshire 
Assistant Deputy Coroner and Al-Skeini in the Court of Appeal had failed to establish a 
jurisdictional link in order for the service claimants to be able to rely on their rights set 
out within the Convention.  However the Grand Chamber ruling in Al-Skeini offers a 
positive application of jurisdiction in favour of service personnel on conflict operations 
through basing its jurisdictional test on authority and control, which means that any 
members of the armed forces and members of respondent states are able to be brought 
within the UK’s ECHR jurisdiction, both inside and outside a UK military base. 
This could potentially lead to service personnel in future cases before the courts being 
able to rely upon their fundamental rights and freedoms set out within the European 
Convention on Human Rights when on conflict operations. In turn this could have 
future implications for the MoD in that their defence of combat immunity might no 
longer apply in relation to the planning and preparation for operations, as liability could 
be placed upon them through a jurisdictional link. 
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The thesis will now turn towards the Armed Forces Compensation Scheme to evaluate 
whether the scheme offers an adequate remedy for injured service personnel should they 
not succeed in a claim at common law.    
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Chapter 8 
The Armed Forces Compensation Scheme 
 
The concept of a compensation scheme requires the Government to place a value on the 
quality of life of a soldier through the sacrifices they make to their country. This has 
resulted in the Government putting a price on the UK’s obligation to service personnel 
through compensating members of the armed forces who have suffered injury as a result 
of military deployment. This chapter will examine the Armed Forces Compensation 
Scheme to assess whether it values members of the armed forces.  
8.1. The history of the armed forces compensation Scheme 
Under contemporary personal injury law compensation is designed to reimburse the 
victim for the pain and injury that have been suffered and attempts to put the person 
injured in a position similar to which they were prior to their accident. Therefore if an 
individual is severely injured during their employment and unable to work then the 
damages they receive should ensure that they are compensated for both their pain and 
suffering and also that their needs are met in the future. The mechanism through which 
the state affords damages to injured service personnel is known as the Armed Forces 
Compensation Scheme (AFCS). Conflict operations may often require service personnel 
to bear a high risk of death or serious injury.299 They should expect in return to always 
be cared for by the Government if they are severely injured during service, this should 
include adequate compensation. 
The AFCS, which is a no-fault compensation scheme, first came into effect on the 6th 
April 2005 through the exercise of powers conferred by Section 1(2) of the Armed 
Forces (Pensions and Compensation) Act 2004. It allowed for service personnel or their 
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dependents to make a claim against the scheme should injury, illness or death occur as a 
result of service, whether that service be abroad on combat operations or during training 
for such operations in the UK.300 The AFCS was a replacement scheme for attributable 
benefits awarded under the War Pensions Scheme and Armed Forces Pension Scheme 
1975 for injuries, illnesses or deaths that arose as a result of service after the 6th April 
2005. Significantly, for the first time, it enabled injured service personnel to make a 
compensation claim without having to wait until they had left service, as previously 
under the War Pensions Scheme claims could not be made until a member of the armed 
forces had been discharged from service.301 Although the War Pensions and Armed 
Forces Pensions schemes have been replaced by the AFCS they are still available for 
service personnel to claim under for injuries and illnesses that occurred before 6th April 
2005. 
As a no-fault compensation scheme, the AFCS means that a member of the armed 
forces does not have to show that they were a victim of a tort to qualify for 
compensation, making it easier for service personnel to receive recompense for their 
injuries and illnesses.302 However, other requirements such as the burden and standard 
of proof fall upon service personnel to prove that their injuries were a direct result of 
service; this will be discussed in further detail later on in this chapter.  As it is a no-fault 
scheme it also means that service personnel still have the option to sue the MoD for 
negligence through the civil courts and receive a higher payment of compensation. As 
discussed in the previous chapters it is difficult for service personnel or their dependants 
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to bring a claim against the MoD for death or injuries arising from combat. An 
exception to this was the Nimrod case which saw the families of the 16 service 
personnel killed receive a large six figure pay-out as a result of the MoD’s negligence; 
however the Nimrod was an isolated case in which the MoD accepted that the deaths 
were a result of their negligence.303 There have been a number of issues connected with 
the scheme which bear examination. Some of these relate to how the compensation is 
calculated in respect of multiple injuries or the worsening of an initial injury, to the 
burden of proof and to the tariff levels. 
8.2. Criticisms of the Compensation Scheme 
In 2007, the Royal British Legion, under their ‘Honour the Covenant’ campaign, argued 
for changes to be made to the AFCS. One of the changes which were suggested was that 
the onus should be put on the Government to prove that military service was not 
responsible for the causing or worsening of service personnel’s injury and illness. Under 
the previous War Pensions Scheme (WPS) the onus was on the Secretary of State to 
show beyond reasonable doubt that service did not play a part in causing or worsening a 
condition.304 However the AFCS claims are based on the balance of probabilities in that 
the onus is on the claimant to prove that service caused or worsened injury or illness. 
The MoD maintains that this is a widely accepted approach to compensation claims as it 
is applied in other schemes such as the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme.305 The 
MoD argue that the burden of proof should remain unchanged from the WPS as the 
nature of service involves taking special risks and it can have uncertain effects on the 
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health and well-being of service personnel, which in some cases may be hard to prove 
were a result of service, for example Gulf War Syndrome. But because this is an 
accepted approach in the civil courts it does not mean that it is the correct approach to 
use in personal injury cases arising from military service, and as we have already seen 
liability claims against the MoD in the civil courts are difficult to establish. It could be 
said that the AFCS imitation of the civil claims system is a result of the MoD’s desire to 
reduce the amount of civil claims for negligence which would minimise liability and 
could save money.306  
Another criticism of placing the burden of proof on service personnel is that it can be 
problematic for them to supply the evidence needed to make a claim as they are not 
always able to provide full medical records. The Royal British Legion voiced their 
concerns over the ability of service personnel to prove that their injuries were a result of 
service in their Honour the Covenant Campaign which they stated; ‘Armed forces 
personnel are in an unusual position in that their medical records are in the hands of the 
employer against whom a compensation claim will be made.’307 It is wrong in principle 
to put a member of the armed forces in a position where they have to obtain their own 
medical records from their employer to whom they are making a compensation claim 
against, while at the same time relying upon employment from them. The question then 
arises as to what happens if the MoD as an employer fails to keep accurate medical 
records of service personnel or looses the medical records altogether. It has been 
reported that out of 150 Veterans from the 1991 war between Iraq and Kuwait, 32% 
have reported inaccurate medical records and 19% reported missing or lost medical 
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records.308 Without adequate medical records service personnel will find it difficult if 
not impossible to make a claim under the AFCS as they will not have the evidence to 
show that their injuries were due to service. Christopher DeLara, a member of the 
United States (U.S.) Army, filed for disability benefits after his tour in Iraq. However 
the U.S. army had no records showing that he had been overseas or of any incidents in 
combat that could have affected him. DeLara appealed, fighting for 5 years before a 
judge accepted the testimony of an officer in his unit, but this came too late as DeLara 
was already briefly homeless and had turned to drugs and alcohol to cope with the 
effects of his tour in Iraq.309 The effects of the DeLara case show the complications in 
claiming for benefits or help of any kind after service in the event that medical or field 
records are lost and bear reason as to why the burden of proof should be on the MoD to 
prove that injuries were not a result of combat.   
Service personnel are no different to an employee of the NHS in which the NHS hold 
their employees medical records or to employees whose employers are in charge of their 
safety reports. Therefore this burden of proof could prove detrimental for those desiring 
to make a claim against the MoD. For this reason it was argued that the ‘balance of 
probabilities’ test might not be appropriate for the armed forces and that because of the 
special risks that the armed forces are required to take the onus should be placed back 
on the Government and the benefit of the doubt, such as believing that their injury was a 
direct result of combat, should be given to the claimant.310 If the Government favour 
placing the burden of proof on the claimant, imitating the civil claims system, then for 
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the sake of consistency, the amount of compensation paid to service personnel should 
be equivalent to that paid to a private citizen. However comparison of the payments 
under the AFCS and compensation payments under the civil claims system shows that 
this is not the case. 
A civilian who is injured as a result of armed conflict stands to receive as a legal 
entitlement a substantially higher compensation payment than a member of the armed 
forces injured in conflict. This was shown in the case of an Iraqi teenager who suffered 
serious spinal injuries and was paralysed after a British soldier dropped his gun, 
discharging it in the process. The Iraqi received a £2 million payment from the MoD. In 
contrast a member of the armed forces would receive less than a quarter of this amount 
from the AFCS for identical injuries.311 The MoD effectively places a higher value on 
civilian casualties than on military ones, evidence of which can be shown from the 
MoD’s pay-out to a civilian suffering from PTSD compared to the pay-out to a member 
of the armed forces for the same injury. One civilian was paid £52,000 for suffering 
PTSD as a result of jets undertaking low flying exercises over Devon. Under the AFCS 
service personnel that can show they have suffered a service related mental disorder 
lasting at least 6 weeks will only receive £3,000, if they can show that the mental injury 
lasted for 5 years or more then they are entitled to £23,000, and those service personnel 
who have permanent mental injury can receive up to £48,000.312 Lance Bombardier 
Kerry Fletcher who was awarded £186,895 by an employment tribunal in a claim 
against the MoD for sexual discrimination commented on how disgusted she was by the 
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meagre compensation that injured soldiers receive, saying that she was ‘embarrassed 
that the MoD have given injured service personnel such a low sum’313  The criticism of 
the MoD and the AFCS has been highlighted by both ministers and the judiciary, in 
which Lord Tunnicliffe argued that the comparison between civil awards and awards 
under the AFCS was ‘inappropriate’ and ‘illegitimate’314 as the AFCS was based upon 
providing compensation to those injured due to service and not on fault finding; the 
AFCS is a ‘no-fault scheme and it is not necessary to prove negligence to receive an 
award.’315 The AFCS has proved unsatisfactory in adequately compensating injured 
service personnel and as a result two major changes were made to the scheme; firstly 
the lump sum payments were increased and secondly anyone suffering from more than 
one injury as a result of a single incident would receive the full reward for each 
injury.316 
The support of the Royal British Legion’s ‘Honour the Covenant’ campaign aided 
the changes to the tariff levels and lump sum payments which were amended in 2008 as 
part of a review by the MoD who published ‘The Nations Commitment: cross- 
Government support to our Armed Forces, their families and veterans.’  The report set 
out the principles that members of the armed forces should not be disadvantaged 
because of service, and looked at how injured soldiers could be better supported. It 
contributed directly to changes being made to the AFCS which included raising the 
lump sum payments. Before this amendment the lump sum payment available to service 
personnel with the highest level of injury in tariff one was only £285,000. This has now 
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doubled to £570,000.317 Under the terms of the scheme a lump sum is now payable to 
service and ex-service personnel based on a 15 level tariff system if they are severely 
injured due to military service.318 The AFCS enables service personnel to an ex-gratia 
payment of  a maximum of £570,000 under tariff level one for the most horrific injuries 
or a combination of injuries, such as the loss of both legs and arms, and a minimum of 
£1,155 under tariff level 15 which would cover injuries such as the loss of a toe.319 For 
those with more serious injuries in tariff levels one to eleven, there is an additional 
payment in the form of Guaranteed Income Payment (GIP) as a means of offsetting loss 
of earnings.320 The GIP is also calculated by severity of injury, with those coming 
within tariff levels one to four receiving the full GIP payment, along with the full lump 
sum at the relevant tariff level for each compensable injury.321 Those suffering injuries 
at tariff levels five and six have their GIP reduced by 75%, tariff levels seven and eight 
are reduced by 50% and tariff levels nine to eleven are reduced by 30%.322 In practice, 
an injury included within the tariff level 5 for example, would be the loss of a leg while 
an injury included within tariff level 7 would be the loss of a foot.323 There is a 25% 
difference between the two tariff levels for the GIP payment and yet both injuries would 
mean the use of prosthetic limbs and difficulty in mobility.  
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Although the scheme has made vast improvements since its introduction in 2005 
there is still heavy criticism from both members of the armed forces and the media over 
the level of compensation awarded and how claims are assessed and awards 
calculated.324 The advancement of medical treatment means that service personnel are 
more likely to survive serious injuries resulting from combat which would have 
previously been fatal to them and therefore the compensation scheme should reflect this. 
Speaking on Channel 4 News, Falkland’s War veteran Simon Weston, who was 
injured in the line of duty, thought the MoD’s actions towards compensating those who 
have been injured in service was “quite appalling”,325 stating that: 
What it says to them (service personnel) is that you are not going to be looked after 
properly; you are not going to get the appropriate amount of compensation, 
regardless of what type of complications you suffer326 
The concerns highlighted by Simon Weston have been emphasised by another of the 
AFCS deficiencies in that it did not take into account complications that can occur after 
the initial injury. This has resulted in injured service personnel sometimes receiving a 
low level of compensation for the initial injury and no compensation for complications 
which arise afterwards. This was highlighted in the case of Secretary of State for 
Defence v Duncan.327 Corporal Duncan was originally awarded £9,250 for a fracture to 
his femur which was later increased to £46,000 by the Pensions Appeal Tribunal (PAT) 
as the complications which arose after the initial injury were to be seen as part of the 
injury. The second claimant, Marine McWilliams, was originally awarded £8,250 for a 
similar injury which was also later increased to £28,750 as his injury would affect him 
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for the rest of his life.328 The Secretary of State appealed to reduce the compensation 
payments, stating that there should be a distinction between the original injury and later 
complications.329 However the MoD denied that this was the objective in the Court of 
Appeal and stated that they had taken the cases to court to seek clarity on the schemes 
basic principle, that the most severely injured would receive the highest 
compensation.330 The appeal was upheld as the Court of Appeal accepted the MoD’s 
submission that ‘medical treatment designed to cure or alleviate pain should not be seen 
as creating a separate injury’.331 It is artificial to conclude that members of the armed 
forces cannot be compensated for later complications arising from the initial injury 
because of the effects of medical treatment. The medical treatment would not have 
otherwise been carried out if it were not for the initial injury occurring and therefore any 
treatment is a result of the initial injury and should be compensated for. The major 
problem with the assessment of awards is ‘the formulaic way in which compensation is 
pegged ignores the fact that a broken body is so much more than the sum of constituent 
injuries.’332 As a result of the media and public criticism of the treatment of the two 
soldiers Defence Secretary Bob Ainsworth brought forward the review of the AFCS to 
determine whether members of the armed forces were being properly supported by the 
scheme.333 Speaking to the Daily Telegraph he stated; ‘As Defence Secretary I cannot 
allow this situation to continue that leaves the public in any doubt over my or the 
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Government’s commitment to servicemen and women’.334 Furthermore, he stated that 
the scheme was not fully equipped to deal with ‘anomalies, legal complexities and 
wider issues’ relating to compensating injured troops.335 Certainly the comments of Bob 
Ainsworth are correct in that the AFCS is not equipped to deal with the wider issues of 
compensating injured service personnel as the scheme does not take into account the 
difficulties that are faced when living with a serious injury. In an attempt to deal with 
the wider issues of the AFCS a review of the scheme was brought forward by a year. 
8.2. The Lord Boyce Review 
In 2009, Bob Ainsworth asked Lord Boyce to conduct an independent review on the 
AFCS. In Lord Boyce’s report on the 10th February 2010, while he found the scheme to 
be “fundamentally sound” he still made a number of recommendations for 
improvement.336 These improvements included; raising by about one-third the annual 
payment made to the youngest and most seriously injured personnel throughout their 
lives to help them deal with the on-going effects of their injuries; retaining the top 
award level of more than £500,000 for the lump sum payments but increasing all other 
levels by up to two-thirds; and increasing the maximum award for those suffering from 
mental illness as a result of their service.337 These proposals were accepted by the 
Government and endorsed by the Coalition administration.338 The Armed Forces and 
Reserve Forces (Compensation scheme) (Amendment) Order 2008 No. 39 came into 
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force to amend the Armed Forces and Reserve Forces Compensation Scheme 2005 in 
respect of its treatment of claims where more than one injury has been sustained in one 
incident and to make amendments to the tariff level.  
One year on from the Lord Boyce report amendments were made that are still in 
place today. The lump sum tariff levels were increased apart from tariff level 1 which 
had previously been doubled in 2008 to £570,000, this meant that for those suffering in 
tariff level 5 for example, were previously awarded £115,000 and now after the 
amendments to the scheme they can receive up to £175,000.339 
The issues raised in the Court of Appeal in Secretary of State for Defence v 
Duncan,340 as to incident related injuries and how the AFCS should take into account 
the prognosis of an injury, how a disorder develops over time and the treatment for the 
injury resulted in the Lord Boyce report making two recommendations that have now 
been implemented. Firstly, providing a greater clarity of the tariff and secondly, 
implementing new procedures so that medical advisors have an opportunity to comment 
on evidence before a tribunal.341 Up until the amendments to the scheme the payment 
for benefit for the effects of medical treatment were excluded, unless the treatment that 
occurred was overseas where medical facilities are limited.  This was because, as the 
MoD argued in the Duncan case, further implications as a result of or after any medical 
treatment were not part of the initial injury and therefore should not be compensated for 
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under the scheme. This exclusion has now been removed and the scheme will take into 
consideration injuries that arise after the initial injury. 
With regard to the burden of proof the review recommended that the onus should 
stay on service personnel to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that their injuries 
were a result of service. However, the review did make a further recommendation that 
should be made regarding the burden of proof, and has been implemented, in cases 
where the MoD has lost service personnel’s records. These modifications will give the 
individual service personnel the benefit of presumption in relation to the material fact 
that would have been determined by that record.342 Therefore service personnel do not 
have to worry about the complications of making a claim if the MoD has lost their 
records. 
The review acknowledged that multiple injuries were not adequately compensated 
for with Lord Boyce recommending that; ‘all injuries should not necessarily be paid at 
there full tariff value to ensure that those with lesser multiple injuries do not receive 
more than someone with a single more serious injury.’343 In doing so a revised approach 
was based on the assessment of the injuries received to each principle body zone, 
identifying the following body zones; head and neck, torso, upper and lower limbs, the 
senses and mental health. The tariff amount should then be combined, with the ‘most 
serious injured zone compensated at 100% at the total tariff level, and then 80%, 60%, 
40% and 20% for each lesser zone retrospectively.’344 
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These breakthrough amendments to the scheme will make a significant difference to 
service personnel injured in combat, making sure that they are compensated not only for 
their injury but for lifetime care. It means the most seriously injured service personnel 
will see an increase of hundreds of thousands of pounds to their compensation, making 
a more generous reflection on the old scheme. 
8.3. Conclusion 
The 2005 incarnation of the AFCS received considerable criticism from both the media 
and injured service personnel for failing to compensate injured service personnel. The 
scheme was often compared to the civil claims system and cases had arisen where the 
MoD had paid civilians significantly higher levels of compensation for the same 
injuries. These criticisms forced the MoD and the Government to review and make 
changes to the scheme, which resulted in the initial increase to the tariff levels in 2008. 
However, this increase in tariff levels did little to assure personnel that they were 
receiving adequate compensation. Criticisms of the scheme continued and were 
heightened by the MoD’s treatment of Corporal Duncan and Marine McWilliams, 
which resulted in the review of the AFCS being brought forward by a year. 
The review implemented numerous changes to the tariff levels, multiple injuries, 
burden of proof and how injuries were to be assessed making a significant change to the 
way service personnel are compensated. These changes are yet to receive criticism and 
are a huge step forward in the MoD’s moral duty of care towards service personnel. 
While the changes to the scheme are welcomed in enabling service personnel to obtain a 
degree of financial compensation for injuries suffered due to service, it should not deter 
attention away from how the injuries were sustained to begin with.  The scheme does 
not prevent the MoD from being held liable for deploying inadequate equipment or 
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provide justice for those that blame the MoD for providing such equipment for the 
deaths or injuries of service personnel.  
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Conclusion 
The aim of the thesis was to consider whether the MoD is liable in tort for equipment 
deficiencies that have led to the deaths and serious injuries of service personnel in the 
course of combat. Equipment deficiencies have been well documented in the media and 
through the courts where questions have been raised as to whether the MoD owed a 
legal duty of care in combat to protect soldiers. 
The starting point of the thesis considered what legal aspects needed to be 
established for a duty of care to arise, concentrating on the three-stage test set out in 
Caparo v Dickman345 of foreseeability, proximity and fair, just and reasonableness. 
Considering previous cases with regard to claims being made against the MoD for 
injuries or deaths arising from combat the first two stages of foreseeability and 
proximity were not difficult to establish. For example, in Mulcahy v Ministry of 
Defence346 it was foreseeable that service personnel will be at high risk of death or 
serious injury in combat and if they are not provided with adequate equipment the 
foreseeability of such risks becomes greater.  Proximity was also established in this case 
through the employer/employee relationship. The third test however is more difficult to 
establish, as to whether it is fair, just and reasonable for a duty of care to be applied in 
combat. Before the third test of Caparo is considered the MoD invoke the doctrine of 
combat immunity in order to remove the issue of liability for negligence from the 
jurisdiction of the court altogether. However the question was how far this immunity 
should apply? 
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The court extended combat immunity to cover the planning and preparation of 
operations in the Multiple Claimants347 case which meant that equipment decisions 
were to fall within the scope of combat immunity so as to negate any claim of 
negligence against the MoD. However this is too loosely expressed and could include 
decisions of equipment made long before any battle commenced to which the fair, just 
and reasonable test of Caparo would be inappropriate to consider. The doctrine of 
combat immunity should not be extended to the extent that it was in the Multiple 
Claimants case and the MoD should be held liable in negligence if inadequate 
equipment contributes to death or serious injury. Elias J in Bici v Minsitry of Defence348 
noted that combat immunity was exceptionally a defence to the Government, and to 
individuals, who take action in the course of actual or imminent armed conflict and 
cause death or injury to soldiers or civilians.349 Equipment claims are directed to things 
that should have been done before any armed conflict, and to extend combat immunity 
from actual and imminent armed conflict to failures made at an earlier stage would be to 
extend it far beyond cases to which it had previously been applied. Therefore combat 
immunity should not apply to equipment decisions and any claims arising as a result of 
equipment decisions made before combat should proceed before the courts to be 
considered on there individual facts.  Nevertheless the thesis showed that the doctrine of 
combat immunity allows the MoD to repudiate most claims in negligence against them 
for deaths or injuries arising from combat. Questions as to whether the MoD should be 
held responsible for deaths and injuries arising from combat include questions of public 
policy and whether it would be fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care on the 
MoD in combat. 
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Arguments that claims should be struck out on the grounds that it would not be fair, 
just and reasonable to impose a duty have been emphasised in cases such as Hill v Chief 
Constable350 and Brooks v Commissioner of Police351 in which they stated that to 
impose a duty of care on the police would lead to the diversion of resources, time and 
money and lead to a defensive approach to policing, arguments which the MoD have 
sought to rely upon in combat-related claims. The Mulcahy case applied the test of fair, 
just and reasonableness by which Neill J held that there was no duty on the defendant to 
maintain a safe system of work, and that one soldier did not owe another soldier a duty 
of care in battle.352 To impose a duty of care on each individual soldier in battle could 
lead to military operations being carried out in a detrimental frame of mind as they 
would be worried about a claim being made against them leading them to be overly 
cautious. A finding of negligence liability for equipment decisions, however, would not 
raise any issues of public policy or lead to operations being carried out detrimentally.  
Each case must be established on its own merits as not all claims arising from combat 
can be grouped together as they are all open to different risks depending of the nature 
and circumstances of the claim. If the MoD fail to provide the best possible equipment 
at their disposal and this leads to the death or serious injury of a member of the armed 
forces then a decision of negligence liability should be made. 
If it can be established that a duty of care is owed by the MoD to service personnel 
the question would be whether the MoD have breached that duty of care. The issue of 
the standard of care has received little attention from the courts in respect of the MoD in 
the context of operational activities. To prove a breach of standard of care, 
foreseeability of harm and the magnitude of risk must be established. It was determined 
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that the MoD would be in breach of its duty of care and therefore not satisfy the 
elements of standard of care if it is foreseeable that the lack of adequate equipment 
would result in death or serious injury and there is a strong likelihood of harm. The 
consequences of such harm are life-threatening and therefore a standard of care should 
be placed upon the MoD to ensure the safety of service personnel on operations. 
Whether the equipment deployed contributed to the deaths and injuries of service 
personnel is a matter of causation and as chapter six established, this depends upon the 
circumstances of each case. Although the issue of causation has not been explored in 
relation to claims being made against the MoD for injuries sustained in combat it is 
apparent from the analysis of case law that inadequate equipment could be found to be 
the direct cause of death or injury and not just an intervening factor. 
 The lack of a civil law remedy and the ability of the MoD to ask the court to strike 
out negligence claims on the basis of combat immunity were found to be incompatible 
with article 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.  The MoD in previous cases had relied 
upon combat immunity to have struck out any negligence claim against them arising 
from combat. However, relying upon previous case law such as Osman v United 
Kingdom,353 the courts have started to favour service personnel and have allowed claims 
arising from combat to go before the court and be decided on their individual merits. In 
relation to article 2 of the ECHR the Grand Chamber ruling in Al-Skeini has effectively 
over turned the Supreme Court’s ruling in Smith v Oxfordshire Assistant Deputy 
Coroner354 and therefore could enable service personnel to bring a claim against the 
MoD for failing to protect the right to life through providing inadequate equipment. 
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Article 2 imposes a positive obligation on the MoD to take appropriate steps to protect 
life by providing adequate armoured equipment for use by soldiers on active service.355 
In conclusion under current civil law the MoD are not liable in tort for equipment 
deficiencies as their reliance on combat immunity and the difficulties in establishing the 
third test of Caparo of fair, just and reasonableness make it difficult for a member of the 
armed forces to bring a claim against the MoD for deaths or injuries that occur as a 
result combat. On the other hand service personnel are able to rely upon their rights 
under the Human Rights Act 1998 after the land mark rulings from the Grand Chamber 
in Al-Skeini and the Supreme Court in Smith and Others v Ministry of Defence resulting 
in service personnel being able to rely upon some form of legal remedy. 
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